

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND COUNTER-TERRORISM IN FRANCE: POLITICAL DISCOURSES UNDER HOLLANDE AND MACRON AFTER THE 2015 PARIS ATTACKS

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Abstract: This study examines how anti-terrorism policies under Hollande and Macron reflect distinct narratives concerning Islam and Islamophobia in France. Applying Critical Discourse Analysis and drawing on ideological divergence, the research analyzes the interplay between political rhetoric, policy, and perceptions of the Muslim community. While Hollande emphasized humanitarian values alongside security measures indirectly affecting Muslims, Macron adopted an assertive stance against "Islamist separatism," leading to policies criticized for institutionalizing Islamophobia. This research argues that Macron's policies and administration align with conservative and nationalist tendencies, evident in his securitized approach and rhetoric echoing far-right narratives shifting closer towards islamophobia. The study highlights the challenges of balancing security with human rights, revealing how political discourse shapes public sentiment and impacts marginalized communities.

Keywords: Anti-Terrorism Policy; Islamophobia; Critical Discourse Analysis; Terrorism in France.

Introduction

Terrorism, classified by the FBI into international and domestic types, is a global concern.¹ Meanwhile, the Larousse online dicti-

¹ FBI, "Terrorism," <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism> (accessed May 20, 2024).

onary defines it as acts of violence, including attacks and hostage-taking, intended to create insecurity, pressure governments, or express hostility toward a community or system.² France, through Operation Chammal, actively targeted ISIS (Islamic States of Iraq and Syria) with airstrikes that weakened the group but also positioned France as a primary terrorist target.³ This led to major attacks in 2015-2016, including the November 13, 2015, Paris Attacks, which killed 148 and injured 350, and the 2016 Nice attack, which claimed 87 lives.⁴ Following these incidents, France recorded the second-highest number of terrorist incidents in the EU.⁵ In parallel, Islamophobia surged, resembling the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in the U.S. after 9/11, as large-scale attacks fueled suspicion, discrimination, and securitization policies affecting Muslim communities, shaping national debates on identity, security, and multiculturalism.⁶

The impact of terrorism extends beyond casualties, creating significant political pressure. Following the November 13, 2015, attacks, François Hollande's administration declared a state of emergency under the *Loi du 3 avril 1955* (The Law of April 3, 1955), allowing authorities to tighten surveillance and detain suspects without court approval.⁷ However, its effectiveness was qu-

² Larousse, "Terrorisme," <https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/terrorisme/77478> (accessed May 20, 2024).

³ Ministère des Armées, "Opération Chammal," <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/monde/grand-levant/operation-chammal> (accessed May 20, 2024); Diego Muro, "Why Did ISIS Target France?", Barcelona Center for International Affairs, November 2015, <https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/why-did-isis-target-france> (accessed May 18, 2024).

⁴ Europol, "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015," December 6, 2021, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015> (accessed May 21, 2024); Laurence Peter, "Paris Attacks: A New Type of Terrorism?," *BBC News*, November 14, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34820847> (accessed May 21, 2024).

⁵ Europol, "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016," https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf (accessed May 21, 2024).

⁶ Ridwan Rosdian, "Memetakan Anatomi Diskursus Islamisme dan Terorisme Islam," *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 13, no. 1 (2018): 1-32.

⁷ Legifrance, "Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence," <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000695350> (accessed May 2, 2024).

questioned after the 2016 Nice attack, despite 424 arrests. During this period, terrorist incidents in France increased 21-fold, contrasting with declines in other EU countries.⁸ Mass raids in so-called 'radical Islamist' environments led to numerous house arrests and mosque searches, which the Muslim community viewed as discriminatory. Experts like jihadist specialist David Thomson argue that radicalization primarily occurs in prisons and online rather than in mosques.⁹ The state of emergency also amplified the influence of new Muslim figures, including bloggers, humanitarian groups, and civil rights organizations like CCIF, who challenged the legitimacy of traditional Muslim representatives. Meanwhile, Hollande's counterterrorism measures lost public support, causing his approval rating to plummet from 50% to 4% in 2016, ultimately prompting him to withdraw from the 2017 presidential election.¹⁰

In 2017, President Emmanuel Macron replaced the state of emergency, in effect since 2015, with the SILT Law (LOI n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017) to strengthen internal security while ensuring legal safeguards.¹¹ This shift responded to criticism that Hollande's emergency policies were overly repressive and lacked a permanent legal basis.¹² Unlike Hollande, who repeatedly extended emergency measures following the Paris Attacks, Macron sought a structured legal framework to balance security and civil rights.¹³ Their contrasting approaches reflect their political ideologies: Hollande, from the left-leaning Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party), initially upheld social justice but later adopted stricter security policies, while Macron, leading the centrist La République En Marche!

⁸ Europol, "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016."

⁹ D. Thomson, *Les Français Jihadistes* (Paris: Les Arènes, 2014).

¹⁰ IFOP, "Les Indices de Popularité-Octobre 2016," October 23, 2016, <https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-indices-de-popularite-octobre-2016/> (accessed May 22, 2024).

¹¹ Legifrance, "Loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme," <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000035932811> (accessed May 2, 2024).

¹² Joseph Bamat, "France's Macron 'to end state of emergency', but keep its anti-terror powers," *France 24*, September 6, 2017, <https://www.france24.com/en/20170609-france-state-emergency-macron-police-powers-civil-liberties-terrorism> (accessed May 22, 2024).

¹³ Ibid.

(LREM Party), pursued a more sustainable counterterrorism strategy.¹⁴

Despite shifts in counterterrorism policies, public anxiety over terrorism in France has remained high, perpetuating Islamophobia. Rooted in the nation's cultural structures and historical experiences, Islamophobia has been reinforced by nationalist narratives linking security concerns to immigration and multiculturalism. This environment has been further shaped by the rise of the Far Right, which capitalizes on these anxieties to advance exclusionary policies. Such developments reflect broader socio-economic and political transformations, underscoring France's struggle to reconcile its republican values with an increasingly diverse society. This article argues that Emmanuel Macron's administration exemplifies this tension, as his policies evolved from moderate liberalism to a more conservative stance. By adopting securitized measures like the 2021 anti-separatism law, Macron institutionalized Islamophobia, reshaping French politics and highlighting the interplay between counterterrorism strategies and nationalist ideologies.

Several studies have examined France's counterterrorism policies following the 2015 Paris attacks. Roy Setiawan's "France's Security Policy on Transnational Terrorism After the November 2015 Paris Attacks" discusses the state of emergency and France's strengthened international cooperation.¹⁵ Lola Priscilla Bella's "The Dynamics of L'État d'Urgence as a Counterterrorism Measure in France (2015-2020)" analyzes the evolution of emergency measures and key attacks, including the 2016 Nice attack and the 2020 Samuel Paty murder.¹⁶ Meanwhile, Nino Tandilashvili's "The

¹⁴ Jon Henley and Angelique Chrisafis, "Paris Attacks: Shootings, Explosions and Hostages," *The Guardian*, November 14, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/13/paris-attacks-shootings-explosions-hostages> (accessed May 22, 2024); Geerts Evelien et al., "European Urban (Counter)-Terrorism's Spacetime matters," in *Contemporary Reflections on Critical Terrorism Studies*, eds. A. Martini and R. da Silva (Birmingham: Routledge EBooks, 2023), 31-52.

¹⁵ Roy Setiawan, "Kebijakan Keamanan Perancis terhadap Terorisme Transnasional Pasca Serangan Paris November 2015," *Jurnal Indonesia Sosial Sains* 3, no. 2 (2022). <https://www.neliti.com/id/publications/468699/kebijakan-keamanan-perancis-terhadap-terorisme-transnasional-pasca-serangan-pari#cite>

¹⁶ Lola Priscilla Bella, "Dinamika Kebijakan L'État d'Urgence sebagai Upaya Kontra-terorisme di Prancis (2015-2020)" (Undergraduate Thesis--Universitas Indonesia, 2023).

Impact of Islamophobia on Muslims Living in France” (2022) explores how Islamophobia, fueled by stereotypes and legal restrictions on Islamic attire, has led to increased discrimination and hate crimes.¹⁷ This study contributes a novel perspective by employing critical discourse analysis of presidential speeches by François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron (2015-2022), examining how their political ideologies influenced counterterrorism rhetoric and policy decisions.

This article is structured to provide a comprehensive analysis of the political discourse surrounding France’s counterterrorism policies. The methodology section explains the application of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) alongside Raymond Aron’s concept of political viewpoints to examine the speeches of François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron. The context section outlines the sociopolitical landscape of France, particularly the evolution of counterterrorism policies and their impact on civil liberties. The findings section explores shifts in discourse through textual, discourse practice, and social practice dimensions, illustrating how media representations and political strategies shaped public perception. Finally, the conclusion discusses the broader implications of these findings, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach between national security and the protection of civil liberties in counterterrorism policy making.

Critical Discourse Analysis as Method

This study employs Norman Fairclough’s (2003) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework to examine the responses of François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron to terrorism through their state speeches, focusing on the interplay between language, power, and ideology.¹⁸ CDA’s three dimensions—text, discourse practice, and social practice—are applied to analyze how political discourse shapes social hegemony in France’s counterterrorism policies post-2015 Paris Attacks. The textual dimension examines ideological and security-related keywords in speeches, while

¹⁷ Nino Tandilashvili, “The Impact of Islamophobia on Muslims Living in France,” *Free University Journal of Asian Studies*, no. 4 (2022). <https://journals.org.ge/index.php/asianstudies/article/view/104>

¹⁸ Norman Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

discourse practice explores media framing by outlets like *Le Monde*, *France TV*, and *Le Figaro*. The social practice dimension assesses public responses to policy implementation, revealing tensions between Hollande's socialist ideology, criticized for conflicting with progressive values, and Macron's centrist efforts to balance human rights with security, despite questions about their effectiveness and outcome.

The concept used to analyze these political differences is drawn from Raymond Aron's *L'Opium des Intellectuels* (1955), which critiques dogmatic political views. Aron argues that intellectuals often adopt overly simplistic narratives, neglecting political complexities.¹⁹ He defines leftist ideology as striving for social equality through radical change, risking totalitarianism, while rightist views emphasize tradition and resistance to change. Centrist positions seek balance but may lean toward one side. However, France's political landscape has shifted beyond the traditional left-right divide, now centering on issues like immigration and security.²⁰ Despite this shift, right-wing parties, such as the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), maintain core ideological elements, preserving traditional political structures.²¹

The following diagram serves as a visual guide, outlining the analytical methods based on the three dimensions of CDA and the use of Raymond Aron's concept. This diagram helps to understand the interrelation between these dimensions and the concept of political views in analyzing discourse.

¹⁹ Aurelian Craiutu and Marco Griffo, "Two Teachers of Intellectual Hygiene: Norberto Bobbio and Raymond Aron on the Role of Intellectuals in Modern Society," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 27, no. 3 (2022): 291-312; Raymond Aron, *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, 1st ed. (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1955).

²⁰ Emile Chabal and Michael C. Behrent, "Between Neo-liberalism and the Nation: France's Political Landscape in 2022," *Modern & Contemporary France* 30, no. 4 (2022): 517-533.

²¹ Rafael Di Tella et al., "Keep Your Enemies Closer: Strategic Platform Adjustments During U.S. and French Elections" (NBER Working Paper No. 31503--National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023).




Figure 1. Critical Discourse Analysis Diagram and the Use of Raymond Aron’s Concept (Source: Researcher’s analysis,2024)

This study employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine inconsistencies in the political views of Presidents François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron through their state speeches, focusing on how both leaders navigate ideological dilemmas in articulating anti-terrorism policies and how these narratives are framed by French media and received by the public. The textual analysis, based on speeches from *vie-publique.fr*, selects two speeches per president—one during the election campaign and one post-policy implementation. The discursive and social practice dimensions analyze coverage from ideologically diverse media—*Le Monde* (Left), *France TV* (Center), and *Le Figaro* (Right) (Pew Research Center, 2018).²² The discursive practice analysis examines how these outlets frame the speeches, while the social practice dimension assesses public reactions as reflected in media discourse. To support the analysis, a text identification table tracks the frequency of key terms related to security and counterterrorism, with findings tabulated based on word usage, English translations, and frequency, then compared with the results of a word cloud.

²² Pew Research Center, “News Media and Political Attitudes in France,” May 17, 2018, <https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/news-media-and-political-attitudes-in-france/> (accessed May 22, 2024).

François Hollande’s Anti-Terrorism Speeches

François Hollande, the Parti Socialiste (PS) candidate in the 2012 presidential election, expressed leftist views on security and anti-terrorism. His speeches following the Toulouse and Montauban attacks (March 22, 2012) and the Paris attacks (November 18, 2015) reflected his stance on national identity and republican values.²³ Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Raymond Aron’s concepts, this study examines inconsistencies in Hollande’s anti-terrorism policies post-2015 by comparing his 2012 campaign rhetoric with his discourse after implementing *L’État d’Urgence* (The state of emergency). A textual analysis, presented in Table 1, highlights key sentences, translations, and frequency of repetition from his 2012 speech on the Toulouse and Montauban attacks, illustrating his inclusive stance on terrorism. Additionally, a word cloud analysis (Figure 2) triangulates these findings, demonstrating shifts in Hollande’s narrative as he navigated security challenges.

Table 1. François Hollande’s Speech Narrative Related to Mohammed Merah’s Terrorist Acts (Source: Researcher’s analysis, 2024)

Sentence (original speech narrative)	Translation (in English)	Frequency (repetition of words or similar meanings)
“Nous sommes tous français.”	We are all French.	30
“La République.”	Republic.	22
“Laïcité.”	Secularism.	10
“La solidarité.”	Solidarity.	6
“Nous devons vivre ensemble.”	“We must live together.	5
“Ce n’est pas un musulman qui a perpétré ces assassinats parce qu’il était musulman.”	It is not a Muslim who committed this murder because he is a Muslim.	4
“L’égalité.”	Equality.	4
“L’islam ce n’est pas l’islamisme.”	Islam is not Islamism.	4

²³ François Hollande, “Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Député PS et Candidat à l’Élection Présidentielle,” *Vie Publique*, March 22, 2012, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/184727-declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-depute-ps-et-candidat-lelection> (accessed May 1, 2024); François Hollande, “Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur les Attaques Terroristes,” *Vie Publique*, November 18, 2015, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/196900-declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-les> (accessed May 1, 2024).

Table 2. Hollande’s Speech Narrative after the 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks (Source: Researcher’s analysis, 2024)

Sentence (original speech narrative)	Translation (in English)	Frequency (repetition of words or similar meanings)
“La France est fière de disposer de forces de cette qualité pour protéger nos concitoyens.”	France is proud to have forces of such quality to protect our fellow citizens	18
“Nous sommes tous français .”	We are all French	12
“La sécurité est la première des libertés.”	Security is the most important freedom	9
“La France restera un pays de liberté.”	France will remain a country of freedom.	7
“La République.”	Republic.	6
“Une guerre contre un terrorisme qui lui-même a décidé de nous mener la guerre.”	War against terrorism that has decided to fight us.	6
“Lutte contre le terrorisme.”	Struggle against terrorism.”	4
“L’unité nationale.”	National unity	4
“La vie doit reprendre.”	Life must go on.	3
“La solidarité.”	Solidarity.	3
“avec des personnels mieux équipés et mieux armés”	With better-equipped and more armed personnel	2
“Nous devons être implacables contre toute forme de haine.”	We must be firm against all forms of hatred.	2
“Aucun acte xénophobe ne doit être toléré.”	No xenophobic actions should be tolerated.	2



Figure 3. Word Cloud Analysis of François Hollande’s Speech After the 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks (Source: Researcher’s analysis, 2024)

Table 2 presents key sentences from Hollande’s speech on November 18, 2015, along with their translations and frequency of repetition. Words such as “*sécurité*” (security, 9 times), followed by “*liberté*” (freedom, 7 times), “*République*” (Republic, 6 times), “*guerre*” (war, 6 times), and “*lutte*” (combat, 4 times). are highlighted. Meanwhile, the Word Cloud analysis results in Figure 3 show consistent frequency for words like “*France*” and “*français*.” Hollande demonstrates a commitment to the Republic’s values by repeating phrases emphasizing unity and rejecting hatred, aiming to strengthen social cohesion amidst the threat of terrorism.

Hollande's Speeches: Textual Analysis

Hollande's speech on March 22, 2012, emphasized inclusivity and secularism, reinforcing the separation between terrorism and religious identity, particularly Islam. His statement, "*Ce n'est pas un musulman qui a perpétré ces assassinats parce qu'il était musulman*" (This is not a Muslim who committed these murders because he was a Muslim) underscored that terrorism is not driven by religious beliefs, promoting unity, tolerance, and human rights. Stressing security as fundamental to freedom, he asserted, "*Oui, la sécurité, ça fait partie aussi de nos engagements, surtout de nos engagements, puisque c'est*

la première des libertés” (Yes, security is also part of our commitments, above all our commitments, since it is the first of freedoms), highlighting the necessity of security for exercising other liberties. Simultaneously, Hollande addressed the terrorist threat while advocating national cohesion, as reflected in “*Nous sommes tous français*” (We are all French) and “*Nous devons vivre ensemble*” (We must live together) rejecting ethnic and religious divisions. His declaration, “*Aucun acte xénophobe ne doit être toléré*” (No xenophobic act should be tolerated), reaffirmed his stance against Islamophobia, ensuring counterterrorism measures would not marginalize Muslims. By distinguishing Islam from extremism through “*L’islam ce n’est pas l’islamisme*” (Islam is not Islamism) and frequently using *français* and *ensemble* (together), he reinforced a collective identity rooted in democratic values and social harmony.

Hollande’s speech on November 18, 2015, following the Paris attacks and the implementation of *L’État d’Urgence*, adopted a firmer and more urgent tone, emphasizing the threat of Islamist terrorism. His statement, “*C’est ainsi que nous assurerons la sécurité des Français avec un contrôle renforcé des frontières*” (This is how we will ensure the security of the French people with strengthened border control), reflect the shift toward stricter security measures, aligning with policies often associated with right-wing perspectives. Unlike his earlier approach, Hollande prioritized military action over diplomatic collaboration, as seen in “*La France est fière de disposer de forces de cette qualité pour protéger nos concitoyens*” (France is proud to have forces of such quality to protect our fellow citizens) and “*Une guerre contre un terrorisme qui lui-même a décidé de nous mener la guerre*” (A war against terrorism, which itself has decided to wage war on us). By framing the fight against terrorism as a war, he reinforced the notion of an existential struggle against extremist threats. His rhetoric highlighted nationalism and security, with frequent references to “*La France*” (18 times), “*Guerre*” (War, 6 times), and “*Sécurité*” (Security, 9 times). While his speech aimed to reassure the public and strengthen national unity, it also sought to prevent the stigmatization of Muslim communities, as emphasized in “*Aucun acte xénophobe ne doit être toléré*.”

Hollande’s speeches in 2012 and 2015 reveal distinct discourse strategies shaped by their respective contexts. In 2012, his language was inclusive, emphasizing secularism (*laïcité* mentioned 10 times),

unity, and tolerance, as reflected in “*Ce n’est pas un musulman qui a perpétré ces assassinats parce qu’il était musulman.*” The frequent use of “*Français*” (30 times) and “*Ensemble*” (5 times) underscored his commitment to an inclusive national identity, aligning with Raymond Aron’s left-wing ideology that prioritizes human rights and individual freedoms. By contrast, his 2015 speech adopted a more security-driven discourse, stressing border control (*contrôle renforcé des frontières*), military strength, and a war narrative, with “*Guerre*” mentioned 6 times. His repeated use of “*Lutte contre le terrorisme*” (Fight against terrorism) underscored the urgency of counter-terrorism efforts. The increased frequency of “*Sécurité*” (9 times) and “*La France*” (18 times) reflected a response to public fear and the necessity of protection. This shift illustrates a negotiation between idealism and realism within Aron’s political framework, as Hollande adapted his discourse to address the growing threat of Islamist terrorism while attempting to uphold his commitment to inclusivity and non-discrimination.

Emmanuel Macron’s Anti-Terrorism Speeches

Following the 2015 Paris attacks, France’s anti-terrorism policies under François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron evolved, reflecting shifts in security and human rights approaches. Hollande’s speeches laid the groundwork for understanding Macron’s changing stance, initially emphasizing humanitarian values and civil liberties in his August 30, 2016, speech.²⁴ However, by October 18, 2017, Macron had adopted a more assertive, militaristic approach, marking a departure from his earlier ideological position.²⁵ This study critically analyzes these speeches to trace this transformation, with Table 3 providing a textual analysis of Macron’s speech post-resignation as Minister of Economy, while Figure 4 presents a word cloud analysis for data triangulation.

²⁴ Emmanuel Macron, “Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et du Numérique,” *Vie Publique*, August 30, 2016, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/200258-declaration-de-m-emmanuel-macron-ministre-de-leconomie-de-lindustrie> (accessed May 1, 2024).

²⁵ Emmanuel Macron, “Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, sur les Élections Européennes,” *Vie Publique*, Oct 18, 2017, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/203884-declaration-de-m-emmanuel-macron-president-de-la-republique-sur-les-e> (accessed May 1, 2024).

Table 3. Macron’s Speech Narrative after Resigning as Minister (Source: Researcher’s analysis, 2024)

Sentence (original speech narrative)	Translation (in English)	Frequency (repetition of words or similar meanings)
“J’éprouvais de poursuivre et même d’amplifier notre travail de transformation en profondeur de notre économie .”	I am determined to continue and even strengthen our work to achieve profound economic transformation	7
“Dès la fin du mois de septembre, je présenterai le diagnostic de la France ”	At the end of September, I will present a diagnosis of France’s current situation.	6
“C’est donc un projet ancré dans le réel”	This is a project rooted in reality	5
“C’est un choix pour être libre , et responsable.”	This is a choice to be free and responsible.	3
“Je suis déterminé à tout faire pour que nos valeurs , nos idées, notre action puissent transformer la France”	I am determined to do everything in my power to ensure that our values, ideas, and actions can transform France.	3
“C’est la raison pour laquelle je souhaite aujourd’hui entamer une nouvelle étape .”	That is why I want to start a new phase today	2
“Il faut, pour susciter et mener ces débats , être libre de formuler.”	To initiate and lead this debate, we must be free to formulate.	1
“Depuis que notre pays est attaqué par le terrorisme ”	Since our country was attacked by terrorism.	1
“La réponse à ce triple défi est évidemment sécuritaire , mais elle est aussi morale et civilisationnelle”	The response to these three challenges is clearly related to security, but also to morality and civilization	1
“Je l’ai remercié de m’avoir permis de servir mon pays.”	I thank him for enabling me to serve my country.	1

Table 4. Narratives in Macron’s Speech after the Parliament Enacted the Anti-Terrorism Law (Source: Researcher’s analysis, 2024)

Sentence (original speech narrative)	Translation (in English)	Frequency (repetition of words or similar meanings)
“ <i>La sécurité du quotidien, c’est lutter contre tout ce qui fait naître chez nos concitoyens les sentiments d’insécurité.</i> ”	Everyday security means combating everything that creates a sense of insecurity among our citizens.	77
“ <i>C’est l’efficacité de l’action des forces de sécurité qui constitue le meilleur rempart contre le terrorisme</i> ”	The effectiveness of actions by security forces is the best defense against terrorism.	30
“ <i>La première mission de l’Etat, c’est bien de protéger nos concitoyens</i> ”	The primary mission of the state is to protect our fellow citizens.	26
“ <i>La lutte contre le terrorisme implique des circuits courts et une grande transversalité.</i> ”	The fight against terrorism requires a streamlined approach and broad collaboration across various sectors.	21
“ <i>Le projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme a été adopté.</i> ”	The bill strengthening domestic security and combating terrorism has been approved.	12
“ <i>Les violences dont vous faites régulièrement l’objet sont inacceptables et doivent être sanctionnées sans relâche.</i> ”	The violence you frequently experience is unacceptable and must be relentlessly punished.	9
“ <i>L’état d’urgence était utile... mais son efficacité marginale n’est plus au rendez-vous.</i> ”	The state of emergency was useful... but its marginal effectiveness is no longer evident.	7
“ <i>Assurer la protection des Français</i> ”	Ensuring the protection of the French people.	5
“ <i>Je considère que le travail qui a été fait par le gouvernement est pleinement satisfaisant.</i> ”	I believe that the work carried out by the government is highly satisfactory.	5
“ <i>Nous devons nous attaquer aussi à la racine de ces problèmes.</i> ”	We must also address the root causes of this issue.	2
“ <i>Nous sommes aujourd’hui trop lents à apporter une réponse adaptée.</i> ”	Currently, we are too slow in providing an appropriate response.	1

reflected in the frequent use of terms like “*transformer notre économie*” (transform our economy, 7 times) and “*diagnostic de la France*” (diagnosis of France, 6 times), suggesting that while security is acknowledged, economic reform remains central. Additionally, Macron frames terrorism without religious or ethnic associations, as seen in “*Depuis que notre pays est attaqué par le terrorisme*” (Since our country has been attacked by terrorism) avoiding explicit links to Islam. He presents counterterrorism as multidimensional, stating, “*La réponse à ce triple défi est évidemment sécuritaire, mais elle est aussi morale et civilisationnelle*” (The response to this triple challenge is obviously security-related, but it is also moral and civilizational) emphasizing a moral and societal perspective rather than targeting specific communities. The recurrence of “*sécuritaire*” and “*morale*” reinforces his comprehensive approach, allowing him to maintain a centrist stance that integrates security with humanitarian values, fostering national unity while ensuring his policies remain inclusive.

Meanwhile, Fairclough’s CDA of Emmanuel Macron’s October 18, 2017, speech reveals a strategic narrative on security and counterterrorism that reinforces his centrist stance. Macron framed terrorism as a general threat, avoiding explicit links to Islam, as seen in “*C’est l’efficacité de l’action des forces de sécurité qui constitue le meilleur rempart contre le terrorisme*” (The effectiveness of the actions taken by security forces is the best defense against terrorism), emphasizing security forces’ role without religious or ethnic attributions. The frequent use of “*sécurité*” (77 times) underscores his focus on national security, while his statement “*La lutte contre le terrorisme implique des circuits courts et une grande transversalité*” (The combat against terrorism requires short decision-making processes and strong cross-sector collaboration) presents counterterrorism as a technical rather than ideological issue. He also affirmed the state’s duty to protect its citizens, as reflected in “*La première mission de l’Etat, c’est bien de protéger nos concitoyens*” (The primary mission of the State is indeed to protect our fellow citizens) with “*protéger*” (protect) appearing 26 times, reinforcing this commitment while steering clear of religious connotations. His emphasis on legislative measures, such as “*Le projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme a été adopté*” (The bill strengthening internal security and the fight against terrorism has been adopted), signals a

shift toward institutional security policies over exceptional measures under *L'état d'urgence*. By acknowledging its diminishing effectiveness, Macron framed his approach as a necessary recalibration rather than a repressive crackdown, balancing security imperatives with civil liberties.

Fairclough's critical discourse analysis of Emmanuel Macron's speeches reveals a rhetorical shift from economic and social transformation to security and counterterrorism. In his August 30, 2016, speech, Macron emphasized freedom and responsibility, using inclusive language such as *libre* and *responsable* to encourage public engagement in economic reform, with *transformer notre économie* mentioned seven times to underscore his vision for economic development. However, by October 18, 2017, his focus had shifted to security, as reflected in the frequent use of *sécurité* (77 times) and *protéger* (26 times), reinforcing the state's duty to safeguard its citizens. While addressing terrorism, he framed it as a general threat, avoiding explicit references to Islam to maintain a centrist stance amid debates on radicalization. His emphasis on new legislation replacing *L'état d'urgence* signaled a strategic move toward institutional security measures over emergency policies. This evolution in rhetoric reflects Macron's adaptation to France's socio-political climate, balancing security concerns with a discourse that avoids targeting specific communities.

Interpreting François Hollande's Discourse

Discourse practices in Hollande's 2012 speech emphasized unity and tolerance following the Toulouse attack, yet media coverage reflected political alignments. *Le Monde's* article, "*Mort de Mohamed Merah: François Hollande salue le courage et la détermination du RAID*" (Death of Mohamed Merah: François Hollande praises the courage and determination of the RAID),²⁶ praised the RAID unit's actions, while its subtitle highlighted Marine Le Pen's critique of the government for being "afraid" to act decisively, calling Merah's death "*prévisible*" (predictable) and suggesting officials

²⁶ Le Monde with AFP, "Mort de Mohamed Merah: François Hollande Salue 'le Courage et la Détermination du RAID'," *Le Monde*, March 22, 2012, https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/03/22/francois-hollande-salue-le-courage-et-la-determination-du-raid_1674119_1471069.html (accessed May 24, 2024).

prioritized public perception over firm action. *France TV*'s coverage, "*Les militants PS craignent que l'affaire Merah fasse 'monter Le Pen et Sarkozy'*" (PS activists fear that the Merah case will 'boost Le Pen and Sarkozy'),²⁷ emphasized Socialist Party supporters' concerns that the incident could strengthen right-wing candidates. Its subtitle noted that Hollande's campaign event not only served political purposes but also became a platform to address public anxieties over security. Similarly, *Le Figaro*'s headline, "*François Hollande en appelle à la 'gravité'*" (François Hollande calls for 'seriousness')²⁸ framed Hollande's response as cautious, reinforced by the subtitle, which indicated his reluctance to draw hasty conclusions after the attack, implicitly contrasting him with right-wing candidates who prioritized swift and decisive measures. These varied portrayals illustrate how security issues shaped political narratives and electoral discourse.

Following the 2015 Paris attacks, media coverage reflected Hollande's evolving security stance. *Le Monde*'s coverage, titled "*Policiers municipaux armés: Hollande recycle une mesure de l'après-Charlie'*" (Armed municipal police officers: Hollande revives a post-Charlie measure).²⁹ highlighted his policy of arming municipal police, echoing measures taken after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. The article suggested this approach prioritized armed force over progressive reforms, while the subtitle clarified that mayors could request weapons for their officers, though approval was not automatic. This shift indicated Hollande's willingness to adopt stricter security policies, deviating from traditional leftist principles. Meanwhile, *Le Figaro*, under the headline "*Hollande gagne le soutien des maires de France'*" (Hollande gains the support of France's

²⁷ Ilan Caro, "Les Militants PS Craignent que l'Affaire Merah Fasse Monter Le Pen et Sarkozy," *France TV Info*, March 23, 2012, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/les-militants-ps-craignent-que-l-affaire-merah-fasse-monter-le-pen-et-sarkozy_75725.html (accessed May 24, 2024).

²⁸ Nicolas Barotte, "Hollande en Appelle à la Gravité," *Le Figaro*, March 23, 2012, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/presidentielle-2012/2012/03/23/01039-20120323ARTFIG00628-hollande-en-appelle-a-la-gravite.php> (accessed May 24, 2024).

²⁹ Alexandre Pouchard, "Policiers municipaux armés: Hollande recycle une mesure de l'après-Charlie," *Le Monde*, November 19, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/11/19/policiers-municipaux-armes-hollande-recycle-une-mesure-de-l-apres-charlie_4813539_4355770.html (accessed May 24, 2024).

mayors),³⁰ emphasized his ability to secure mayoral support, reinforcing his leadership legitimacy. The subtitle detailed his speech before the Association of French Mayors, where he outlined security measures post-attacks. Unlike centrist outlets, which provided no direct coverage, *Le Figaro* framed Hollande's stance as a strategic move to balance public security demands with leftist ideological commitments.

François Hollande's discursive shift between 2012 and 2015 reflects evolving socio-political dynamics in response to security crises. In 2012, following the Toulouse Attack, he promoted unity and tolerance, though media coverage diverged: *Le Monde* focused on police efforts and political debates, *France TV* highlighted left-wing concerns over right-wing exploitation, and *Le Figaro* depicted him as indecisive. By 2015, after the Paris Attacks, his rhetoric shifted to security-focused measures, such as arming municipal police—*Le Figaro* viewed this as reinforcing his legitimacy, while *Le Monde* criticized it as regressive. This transition from symbolic unity to pragmatic security underscored the tension between leftist idealism and political necessity, aligning with Aron's perspective on ideology as both principle and strategy. Furthermore, media framing shaped public perceptions of Islam and terrorism, as French international broadcasters often emphasized Muslim radicalization, reinforcing Islam as a security threat. This selective discourse, as analyzed by Polonska-Kimunguyi (2016), contributed to the alienation and marginalization of Muslim communities in France.³¹

François Hollande's Social Discourse: From Political Ideology to Pragmatism

Hollande's discourse in 2012 sought to distinguish Islam from Islamism, reflecting his efforts to promote inclusivity in line with

³⁰ François-Xavier Bourmaud, "Hollande Gagne le Soutien des Maires de France," *Le Figaro*, November 18, 2015, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2015/11/18/01002-20151118ARTFIG00283-hollande-gagne-le-soutien-des-maires-de-france.php> (accessed May 25, 2024).

³¹ E. Polonska-Kimunguyi and M. Gillespie, "Terrorism Discourse on French International Broadcasting: *France 24* and the Case of Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Paris," *European Journal of Communication* 31, no. 5 (2016): 568-583. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323116669453>

Socialist Party (PS) values. However, *Le Monde's* article, “*Sécurité et immigration ne sont pas au centre des préoccupations des électeurs*” (Security and immigration are not at the center of voters’ concerns),³² cited Ipsos-Logica Business Consulting data showing that only 29% of Hollande’s voters prioritized security, compared to 64% of Le Pen’s and 36% of Sarkozy’s supporters. This underscored a partisan divide on security concerns. Following the Toulouse attack, political tensions escalated. *France TV's* article, “*UMP, PS, FN, MoDem: après Toulouse, les accusations fusent*” (UMP, PS, FN, MoDem: After Toulouse, the Accusations Escalate)³³ detailed accusations between parties, with the UMP blaming the PS for weakening security policies, while Hollande criticized systemic failures. *Le Figaro's* coverage, “*Après Toulouse...*” (After Toulouse...)³⁴ framed public sentiment as shifting from horror to relief, justifying Sarkozy’s repressive policies and criticizing the left’s reluctance to confront radical Islamism. It also highlighted that over 200 French citizens joined jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria by late 2012.³⁵ Domestically, polls indicated declining tolerance towards Muslims, with only 53% of respondents expressing positive views, compared to 79.5% for Jews, and merely 26% holding favorable opinions on Islam.³⁶ These three articles collec-

³² Pierre Jaxel-Truer and Thomas Wieder, “Sécurité et Immigration ne Sont Pas au Centre des Préoccupations des Électeurs,” *Le Monde*, March 27, 2012, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/03/27/securite-et-immigration-ne-sont-pas-au-centre-des-preoccupations-des-electeurs_5990200_823448.html (accessed May 27, 2024).

³³ Salomé Legrand, “UMP, PS, FN, MoDem: Après Toulouse, Qui Accuse Qui de Quoi?” *France TV Info*, March 27, 2012, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/france/ump-ps-fn-modem-apres-toulouse-qui-accuse-qui-de-quoi_75377.html (accessed May 27, 2024).

³⁴ Alexis Brézet, “Après Toulouse...,” *Le Figaro*, March 22, 2012, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/lefigaromagazine/2012/03/22/01006-20120322ARTFIG00873-apres-toulouse.php> (accessed May 27, 2024).

³⁵ Seth G. Jones, Maxwell B. Markusen, and Boris Toucas, “From the IRA to the Islamic State: The Evolving Terrorism Threat in Europe,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), December 19, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ira-islamic-state-evolving-terrorism-threat-europe> (accessed May 30, 2024).

³⁶ Marjorie Moya, “Forgotten Women: The Impact of Islamophobia on Muslim Women in France,” Europe Network Against Racism, May 2016, https://www.enar-eu.org/wp-content/uploads/forgotten_women_report_france_-_final.pdf (accessed May 30, 2024).

tively illustrate how the attack intensified political disputes and shaped public discourse on security and integration.

Hollande's 2015 speech ignited debates on civil liberties amid heightened security concerns following the Paris attacks. The implementation of *L'État d'Urgence* expanded government powers, including warrantless arrests, leading to 424 terrorism-related arrests in France between 2015-2016.³⁷ While Hollande intensified airstrikes on ISIS through Operation Chammal, his policies also affected the Muslim minority, with 429 Islamophobic attacks recorded in 2015.³⁸ *Le Monde's* article, "*Attentats du 13 novembre: le gouvernement dévoile son projet de loi pour prolonger l'état d'urgence*" (November 13 attacks: government unveils bill to extend state of emergency)³⁹ reported on the government's push to extend *L'État d'Urgence*, emphasizing threats to civil liberties, particularly among left-leaning voters. Meanwhile, *France TV's* coverage, "*Attentats de Paris: François Hollande annonce l'armement des polices municipales*" (Paris attacks: François Hollande announces the arming of municipal police forces),⁴⁰ detailed his policy to arm municipal police while simultaneously affirming France's commitment to accepting 24,000-30,000 new immigrants, revealing ideological ambiguity. *Le Figaro's* article, "*Les policiers pourront porter leur arme 24 heures sur 24*" (Police officers will be able to carry their weapons 24 hours a

³⁷ Europol, "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016."

³⁸ Ministère des Armées, "Opération Chammal," 2016, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/operation-chammal> (accessed May 31, 2024); Statista Research Department, "Number of Anti-Muslim Acts that were Reported in France from 2010 to 2022," August 7, 2024, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/782190/offenses-anti-muslim-by-region-la-france/#:~:text=In%202022%20in%20France%2C%20188,213%20Islamophobic%20acts%20were%20reported> (accessed May 31, 2024).

³⁹ *Le Monde*, "Attentats du 13 novembre: le gouvernement dévoile son projet de loi pour prolonger l'état d'urgence de 3 mois," *Le Monde*, November 18, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/18/attentats-du-13-novembre-le-gouvernement-devoile-son-projet-de-loi-pour-prolonger-l-etat-d-urgence-de-3-mois_4812646_4809495.html (accessed June 1, 2024).

⁴⁰ France TV Info, "Attentats de Paris: François Hollande Annonce l'Armement des Polices Municipales," *France TV Info*, November 19, 2015, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/terrorisme/attaques-du-13-novembre-a-paris/attentats-de-paris-francois-hollande-annonce-l-armement-des-polices-municipales_1181627.html (accessed June 1, 2024).

day),⁴¹ framed Hollande's policies as aligning with right-wing security measures, portraying his stance as a political shift. His contradictory approach—advocating national unity while implementing restrictive policies—led to public uncertainty regarding his ideological consistency, particularly among left-wing supporters.

The analysis of Fairclough's social practice dimension in Hollande's 2012 and 2015 speeches reveals shifts in political ideology, public discourse, and their impact on France's Muslim community. In 2012, Hollande's statement, "*l'islam ce n'est pas l'islamisme*," reflected the Socialist Party's progressive stance on identity and integration. However, security was not a priority for left-wing voters, and the Toulouse tragedy fueled political tensions, with UMP accusing PS of political opportunism, while *Le Figaro* highlighted Sarkozy's repressive response to radicalism. This discourse contributed to widespread intolerance, as only 26% of the French population viewed Islam positively.⁴² In the second speech, Hollande's adoption of *L'État d'Urgence* marked a shift toward repressive security measures, expanding state authority and intensifying military action against ISIS. While *Le Monde* warned of threats to civil liberties, *Le Figaro* framed it as a right-wing victory. Using Raymond Aron's concept of political ideology, Hollande's shift from a progressive left-wing stance to pragmatic policies prioritizing stability over social solidarity underscores how security and integration debates shape public perceptions and exacerbate the vulnerability of the Muslim community in France.

Interpreting Emmanuel Macron's Discourse

The discourse practice dimension critically examines how *Le Monde*, *France TV*, and *Le Figaro* frame Emmanuel Macron's resignation and policies. *Le Monde*'s article, "*Quel est le bilan d'Emmanuel Macron au gouvernement?*" (What is Emmanuel Macron's record in

⁴¹ Jean-Marc Leclerc and *Le Figaro*, "Les Policiers Pourront Porter Leur Arme 24 Heures sur 24," *Le Figaro*, November 19, 2015, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/19/01016-20151119ARTFIG00092-les-policiers-pourront-porter-leur-arme-24-heures-sur-24.php> (accessed June 1, 2024).

⁴² Statista Research Department, "Number of Anti-Muslim Acts."

government?)⁴³ with the subheading questioning his reform efforts, conveys skepticism about his effectiveness in government. On the other hand, *France TV*'s "*Démission: le cas Macron*" (Resignation: the Macron case),⁴⁴ presents a more favorable view, emphasizing his work ethic and background as a former banker. Meanwhile, *Le Figaro*'s "*Emmanuel Macron va démissionner du gouvernement*" (Emmanuel Macron to resign from government),⁴⁵ with a subheading highlighting his ambition and rising electability, portrays him as a key left-wing reformist surpassing Manuel Valls.

Macron's second speech emphasized law enforcement and security, portraying the government as a strong and proactive entity. *Le Monde*'s "*Sur fond de menace terroriste, Macron présente sa stratégie en matière de sécurité*" (Against a backdrop of terrorist threats, Macron presents his security strategy)⁴⁶ highlighted the urgency of the terrorist threat, presenting his policies as both ambitious and complex while implicitly questioning their effectiveness. *France TV*'s "*Sécurité: ce qu'Emmanuel Macron a annoncé aux forces de l'ordre*" (Security: what Emmanuel Macron announced to law enforcement officers)⁴⁷ took a direct approach, focusing on Macron's concrete announcements for law enforcement without broader analysis. Meanwhile, *Le Figaro*'s "*Missions, moyens, protection... Macron tente de rassurer les policiers*" (Missions, resources, protection... Macron tries

⁴³ Alexandre Pouchard and Anne-Aël Durand, "Quel est le bilan d'Emmanuel Macron au gouvernement?," *Le Monde*, August 30, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2016/08/30/quel-bilan-pour-emmanuel-macron-au-gouvernement_4990086_4355770.html (accessed June 4, 2024).

⁴⁴ France TV Info, "Démission: Le Cas Macron," *France TV Info*, August 30, 2016, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron/demission-le-cas-macron_1802521.html (accessed June 4, 2024).

⁴⁵ Marc de Boni, Arthur Berdah and Solenn de Royer, "Emmanuel Macron Va Démissionner du Gouvernement," *Le Figaro*, August 30, 2016, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/2016/08/30/25001-20160830ARTFIG00123-emmanuel-macron-va-demissionner-du-gouvernement.php> (accessed June 4, 2024).

⁴⁶ Le Monde, AFP, and Reuters, "Emmanuel Macron présente sa stratégie en matière de sécurité sur fond de menace terroriste," *Le Monde*, October 18, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/emmanuel-macron/article/2017/10/18/emmanuel-macron-presente-sa-strategie-en-matiere-de-securite-sur-fond-de-menace-terroriste_5202843_5008430.html (accessed June 4, 2024).

⁴⁷ France 3, "Sécurité: Ce qu'Emmanuel Macron a annoncé aux forces de l'ordre," *France TV Info*, October 18, 2017, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/emploi/metiers/armee-et-securite/securite-ce-qu-emmanuel-macron-a-annonce-aux-forces-de-l-ordre_2425873.html (accessed June 5, 2024).

to reassure police officers)⁴⁸ framed his policies as a response to police dissatisfaction, emphasizing resource additions while also raising concerns about civil liberties. These differences reflect how French media outlets shaped Macron's image based on their political perspectives.

Fairclough's discourse practice analysis of media coverage by *Le Monde*, *France TV*, and *Le Figaro* revealed distinct framing of Macron's speeches. In his first speech, *Le Monde's* headline and subheading conveyed skepticism about the effectiveness of his reforms, while *France TV* adopted a more favorable tone, emphasizing his work ethic and popularity as a left-wing figure. *Le Figaro* framed him as ambitious, focusing on his electability and presidential aspirations. In the second speech, the focus shifted to security policies. *Le Monde* contextualized Macron's strategy within the terrorist threat, highlighting its complexity and challenges. *France TV* presented a positive view, emphasizing his concrete measures for security forces, whereas *Le Figaro* underscored government commitments to police resources while acknowledging underlying social tensions. These variations reflect how each outlet's political stance shaped its portrayal of Macron's policies.

Emmanuel Macron's Social Discourse: Security over Inclusion?

The analysis of the social practice dimension highlights how *Le Monde*, *France TV*, and *Le Figaro* framed Emmanuel Macron's resignation within the broader context of French politics, shaping public perception through distinct narratives. *Le Monde*, with the headline "*Emmanuel Macron démissionne pour 'entamer une nouvelle étape de son combat'*" (Emmanuel Macron resigns to 'embark on a new stage of his struggle')⁴⁹ presented his resignation as a strategic mo-

⁴⁸ Christine Ducros and Jean-Marc Leclerc, "Missions, Moyens, Protection... Macron tente de Rassurer les Policiers," *Le Figaro*, October 18, 2017, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/2017/10/18/25001-20171018ARTFIG00112-macron-lance-en-grande-pompe-sa-police-de-securite-du-quotidien.php> (accessed June 5, 2024).

⁴⁹ Le Monde with AFP, "Emmanuel Macron démissionne pour entamer une nouvelle étape de son combat," *Le Monde*, August 30, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/08/30/apres-la-demission-de-macron-sapin-nomme-ministre-de-l-economie-et-des-finances_4990065_823448.html (accessed June 5, 2024).

ve to strengthen his political position, emphasizing his transition to focus on *En Marche!* and the shift of power to his successor, Michel Sapin. On the other hand, *France TV*, through “*Emmanuel Macron: comète ou phénomène politique?*” (Emmanuel Macron: comet or political phenomenon?)⁵⁰ framed him as a rising political figure, emphasizing his popularity and public appreciation. Meanwhile, *Le Figaro*, with “*Les ‘Jeunes avec Macron’ espèrent l’entrée en campagne de leur champion*” (The ‘Jeunes avec Macron’ hope their champion will enter the campaign trail)⁵¹ highlighted strong youth support, portraying his movement as one of hope and mobilization. These differing framings illustrate how media outlets shape political discourse and influence public perception ahead of elections. Ultimately, Macron secured a decisive victory in the 2017 presidential election with 66.1% of the vote, becoming France’s youngest president.⁵²

The headlines and subheadings from *Le Monde*, *France TV*, and *Le Figaro* on Macron’s October 18, 2017, speech reflected public responses to his security policies. *Le Monde*’s “*Le projet de loi antiterroriste définitivement adopté*” (Anti-terrorism bill definitively adopted)⁵³ highlighted the passage of a law expanding state authority, including the power to close places of worship without judicial approval, raising concerns about potential human rights violations. *France TV*, through “*Police de sécurité du quotidien: ‘Le danger est de refaire à l’exact la police de proximité’, estime un syndicat*” (Police de sécurité du quotidien: “The danger is that we’ll be remaking local

⁵⁰ France TV Info, “Emmanuel Macron: Comète ou Phénomène Politique?” *France TV Info*, August 30, 2016, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron/emmanuel-macron-comete-ou-phenomene-politique_1802475.html (accessed June 7, 2024).

⁵¹ Arthur Berdah, “Les Jeunes avec Macron Espèrent l’Entrée en Campagne de Leur Champion,” *Le Figaro*, August 30, 2016, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/2016/08/30/25001-20160830ARTFIG00349-les-jeunes-avec-macron-esperent-l-entree-en-campagne-de-leur-champion.php> (accessed June 7, 2024).

⁵² Ipsos, “2017 French Election: Our Highly Accurate Estimations,” *Ipsos*, May 9, 2017, <https://www.ipsos.com/en/2017-french-election-our-highly-accurate-estimations> (accessed June 9, 2024).

⁵³ Le Monde with AFP, “Le projet de loi antiterroriste définitivement adopté,” *Le Monde*, October 18, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/10/18/le-projet-de-loi-antiterroriste-definitivement-adopte_5202811_1653578.html (accessed June 7, 2024).

policing in exactly the same way', says a trade union)⁵⁴ portrayed skepticism from security professionals, suggesting the initiative was more political than practical. In contrast, *Le Figaro*, with "*Le projet sécuritaire de l'Élysée est un pari ambitieux qui nécessite de grands moyens*" (The Élysée Palace's security project is an ambitious gamble that requires considerable resources)⁵⁵ framed Macron's policies as a strategic effort to improve police-community relations, particularly after the Théo affair. These narratives underscored the debate between security and civil liberties, while the decrease in Islamophobic attacks from 121 in 2017 to 100 in 2018 suggested progress in national unity efforts.⁵⁶

Analyzing Emmanuel Macron's political discourse through the social practice dimension reveals how *Le Monde*, *France TV*, and *Le Figaro* shaped public perceptions of his leadership. While these outlets depicted him as a centrist balancing innovation and stability, his security policies, framed as counterterrorism measures, generated controversy. *Le Monde* warned of civil liberty violations, *France TV* criticized the measures as political maneuvering, and *Le Figaro* highlighted their potential to improve police-community relations. However, Macron's crackdown on over 50 Muslim organizations, including the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), reinforced Islamophobic narratives, shifting blame for social tensions onto marginalized communities while systemic issues like discrimination and police brutality remained unaddressed.⁵⁷ His selective defense of free speech—protecting anti-Islamic rhetoric while suppressing criticism of Zionism—further exposed contradictions in his stance on civil liberties. By prioritizing secu-

⁵⁴ France TV Info, "Police de Sécurité du Quotidien: Le Danger est de Refaire à l'Exact la Police de Proximité, Estime un Syndicat," *France TV Info*, October 18, 2017, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits-divers/police/police-de-securite-du-quotidien-le-danger-est-de-refaire-a-lexact-la-police-de-proximite-estime-un-syndic-at_2424955.html (accessed June 7, 2024).

⁵⁵ Jean-Marc Leclerc, "Le projet sécuritaire de l'Élysée est un pari ambitieux qui nécessite de grands moyens," *Le Figaro*, October 18, 2017, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2017/10/18/01016-20171018ARTFIG00288-le-projet-securitaire-de-l-elysee-est-un-pari-ambitieux-qui-necessite-de-grands-moyens.php> (accessed June 7, 2024).

⁵⁶ Statista Research Department, "Number of Anti-Muslim Acts."

⁵⁷ Ali Saad, "Islamophobia as an Integration Strategy in France," *Aljazeera*, October 28, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/10/28/islamophobia-as-an-integration-strategy-in-france> (accessed November 25, 2024).

rity over inclusion and leveraging it for political gain, Macron risks exacerbating social divisions and undermining national cohesion.

Conclusion

This study has examined how the speeches of Presidents François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron reflect their evolving political views and their influence on France's counterterrorism policies. Using Norman Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Raymond Aron's concept of political viewpoint differences, this research highlights the shifts in Hollande's and Macron's approaches to national security following the 2015 Paris attacks, analyzed through three discourse dimensions.

Hollande and Macron's counterterrorism approaches evolved across textual, discourse practice, and social practice dimensions, reflecting a shift between human rights considerations and securitization. In the textual dimension, Hollande initially condemned Islamophobia and framed counterterrorism within a human rights discourse, but after the attacks, his rhetoric shifted toward nationalism and security, diverging from his leftist stance. Macron, while initially advocating anti-discrimination, gradually adopted a more securitized narrative, especially leading up to the 2022 election. The discourse practice dimension highlights how media framed their policies differently: *Le Monde* cautioned against the erosion of civil liberties, *France TV* remained neutral, and *Le Figaro* supported security-driven measures. These framings influenced public perception of counterterrorism efforts. In the social practice dimension, Hollande's emergency policies disproportionately targeted Muslim communities, prompting him to increase immigration quotas to maintain his leftist identity. Macron, though initially distancing himself from anti-Muslim policies, later adopted restrictive measures, such as dissolving CCIF, to appeal to conservative voters. These developments underscore how political discourse, media representation, and electoral dynamics shape France's counterterrorism policies.

These findings highlight the need for counterterrorism policies that balance national security with human rights protections. Overly repressive measures risk deepening social divisions and undermining government legitimacy. While inclusive narratives, such as Hollande's earlier discourse, can foster social cohesion,

they must be accompanied by robust risk management. Effective policies should account for local socio-cultural contexts while ensuring transparency and accountability. By integrating civil liberties and social justice into counterterrorism efforts, policymakers can create sustainable and inclusive security frameworks.

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