

# FAITH IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE PLURALITY OF YOUNG MUSLIMS' PIETY ON SOCIAL MEDIA

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**Abstract:** Islamic fundamentalism has undergone a significant transformation of the movement along with the emergence of social media. The presence of a new pattern of Islamic fundamentalism is influenced by young preachers who have succeeded in building religious authority through digital Islamic creative content that contains ideas about political Islam, *hijrah da'wah*, and salafism ideology. This article aims to analyze the interplay between the genealogy of the movement and the typology of Islamic fundamentalist thought, *hijrah da'wah*, and the plurality of millennial Muslim piety. This qualitative research uses literature studies, which its operationalization was done by examining, identifying, and finding a gap from references on related topics. Subsequently as well as analyzing digital content to find out the factors that affect the formation of millennial Muslim piety. This article finds that the transformation of the Islamic fundamentalism movement through *hijrah da'wah* on social media contributes to shaping the piety of Muslim adolescents into three typologies, namely scripturalist piety, popular piety, and progressive piety. The phenomenon of global fundamentalism, the fragmentation of religious authority, and the response to the challenges of modernity are the factors that led to the emergence of the plurality of piety. Although the plurality of piety has implications for polarization with one another, Islamic *da'wah* in the digital era provides an alternative source of religious learning for millennial Muslims.

**Keywords:** Faith; Fundamentalism; *Hijrah*; Piety; Social Media.

## Introduction

This article highlights the dynamic relationship between digital technology, Islamic fundamentalism, and the formation of Muslim youth piety, emphasizing the transformative impact of social media on religious practices and identities. The landscape of Muslim youth piety in Indonesia, particularly in the context of digital interactions and Islamic fundamentalism, has been undergoing cultural adaptation of fundamentalism. For instance, the Salafi movement, once perceived as conservative, has evolved to integrate modernity and popular culture into its *da'wah*,<sup>1</sup> demonstrating a shift towards a more adaptive form of Islamic neo-fundamentalism.<sup>2</sup> Online interactions on social media facilitate young Muslims to learn religious knowledge more easily. This accessibility contributes to the formation of the faith of young people with diverse expressions of piety. *Hijrah da'wah* is becoming an Islamic lifestyle trend adopted by young Muslims as an implication of making digital Islamic content as literature for understanding their religion. Various literature containing the principles of Islamic fundamentalism is one of the ideological features that fills religious discourse on social media.

Studies discussing faith in the digital era have existed before, as Gary Bunt underlines the importance of religious authorities to take the role of *da'wah* in social media. He introduces the concept of *micro-authorities*, which are individual figures on digital platforms who have a strong influence in the formation of younger Muslim's piety. According to Bunt, their influence is often based on their charisma, popularity, or ability to communicate the message of Islam in a way that is relevant and easily receptive to the younger generation.<sup>3</sup> Then, the academic work written very well by Eva F.

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<sup>1</sup> Chris Chaplin, "Salafi Activism and Promotion of a Modern Muslim Identity: Evolving Mediums of Da'wah amongst Yogyakarta University Students," *South East Asia Research* 26, no. 1 (2018): 3-20.

<sup>2</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia," in *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam*, ed. Peter Mandaville (New York, 2022; online edn, Oxford Academic 2022), 135-157. See also Nafik Muthohirin, "Salafi Madrasas: Ideology, Transformation, and Implication for Multiculturalism in Indonesia," *Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan* 10, no. 1 (2022): 81-100.

<sup>3</sup> Gary R. Bunt, *Hashtag Islam: How Cyber Islamic Environments are Transforming Religious Authority* (N.p.: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), 71-73.

Nisa,<sup>4</sup> Taufik,<sup>5</sup> and Wahyudi Akmaliyah,<sup>6</sup> in which the three of them studied creative *da'wah* and the phenomenon of *hijrah* initiated by Islamic preachers on social media, succeeded in fragmenting traditional religious authority in Indonesia. Akmaliyah's work briefly touches on *hijrah da'wah* as a narrative campaigned by Islamic fundamentalism groups, so this research provides a more complete understanding of the genealogy, typology of thought, and *hijrah da'wah* as a new pattern for the rise of fundamentalist ideology in the contemporary era.

Islamic fundamentalism as an Islamic political revival movement,<sup>7</sup> is a global phenomenon that interrupts *da'wah* and Islamic social movements in Indonesia. After the fall of the New Order (1998), a number of Islamic fundamentalist movements emerged to the public with different religious characteristics. Harakah Tarbiyah, Jamaah Salafi, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, dissolved by the government in 2017) are categorized as part of fundamentalist Islamic organizations that characterize the idea of Islamic repoliticization with varying typologies of thought and movements.<sup>8</sup>

The context of the struggle of Islamic fundamentalism has undergone a significant transformation in the midst of the use of social media as a means of preaching.<sup>9</sup> In its emergence in the 1980s and early 2000s, the *da'wah* model of transnational Islamic

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<sup>4</sup> Eva F. Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Da'wa: The Visual Culture of Instagram amongst Female Muslim Youth in Indonesia," *ASIASCAPE: Digital Asia* 5, no. 1-2 (2018): 68-99.

<sup>5</sup> H.M. Taufik and Amalia Taufik, "Hijrah and Pop-Culture: Hijab and Other Muslim Fashions Among Students in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara," *Teosofia: Indonesian Journal of Islamic Mysticism* 8, no. 2 (2019): 97-116.

<sup>6</sup> Wahyudi Akmalah, "The Rise of Cool Ustadz: Preaching, Subcultures and The Pemuda Hijrah Movement," in *The New Santri: The Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*, eds. Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Najib Burhani (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2020), 239-257.

<sup>7</sup> Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism; Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (London: University of California Press, 1998), 2.

<sup>8</sup> Nafik Muthohirin, *Fundamentalisme Islam: Gerakan dan Tipologi Pemikiran Aktivis Dakwah Kampus* (Jakarta: IndoStrategi, 2014).

<sup>9</sup> Nafik Muthohirin, "Da'wa in Social Media: The Views of Ustad Hanan Attaki and Felix Siauw to the Hijrah Phenomenon," *Ajkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 17, no. 2 (2021): 249-270.

organizations seemed exclusive, scriptural, and static,<sup>10</sup> but now it is becoming increasingly passionate because of the use of digital creative Islam. Nisa proves that religious messages posted through *Instagram* have an effect on the understanding of religion and piety of Muslim teenagers.<sup>11</sup> Through *hijrah da'wah* and various accompanying digital Islamic literature, Muslim teenagers love cool *ustādh* and make them role models in improving religious understanding.<sup>12</sup>

This fact proves that the movement and ideology of Islamic fundamentalism have gained a great influence in Indonesia.<sup>13</sup> These various movements are associated with disseminating their thoughts through offline and online approaches.<sup>14</sup> Harakah Tarbiyah, for example, is a Muslim intellectual organization oriented towards *da'wah* and Islamic education. The center of infiltration of Tarbiyah's movement and thought is in universities. Since its inception, Tarbiyah has emphasized the dissemination of its ideas through Islamic activities (discussions, studies, and training Islam) in a scriptural manner through the cadre system of campus *da'wah* institutions. Tarbiyah offers a way to "return to Islam", or interpreted as *Hijrah*, because Muslims are considered to have not carried out the commandments and stayed away from religious prohibitions. According to them, quoted from Yudi Latif, the behavior of Muslims is still highly intervened by globalism and secularism,<sup>15</sup> so that the "way back to Islam" can be interpreted as the doctrine of *hijrah* which is one of the four main doctrines of Harakah Tarbiyah taught from the main thought of Sayyid Qutb, the ideo-

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<sup>10</sup> Christoph S., *From Islam to Islamism, from Islamic Fundamentalism to Jihadism: An Attempt at Ideology-Critical Enlightenment* (Humberg: Libri Plureos GmbH, 2024), 7-8.

<sup>11</sup> Nisa. "Creative and Lucrative Da'wa." See also Taufik and Taufik, "Hijrah and Pop-Culture."

<sup>12</sup> Akmaliah, "The Rise of Cool Ustadz."

<sup>13</sup> Kasinyo Harto, *Fundamentalisme Islam di Perguruan Tinggi Umum: Kasus Gerakan Keagamaan Mahasiswa Universitas Sriwijaya Palembang* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat Departemen Agama RI, 2008).

<sup>14</sup> Hew Wai Weng, "On-Offline Dakwah: Social Media and Islamic Preaching in Malaysia and Indonesia," in *Mediatized Religion in Asia*, eds. Kerstin Radde-Antweiler and Xenia Zeiler (New York: Routledge, 2018), 89-104.

<sup>15</sup> Yudi Latif, "The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in Modernization of Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 12, no. 3 (2005): 374.

logue of the Muslim Brotherhood, to achieve the repoliticization of Islam (*Islamic state*).<sup>16</sup>

At first, the movement of Islamic fundamentalism entered through public universities in Indonesia. Students take part in Islamic studies or mentoring—better known as the concept of *usrab* or *liqā'*—in university mosques. *Usrah* or *liqā'* is an important part of how to preach the doctrine of hijrah in offline form when the digital era is not as popular as it is now. Imaduddin Abdurrahim, a militant activist and the main actor in the dissemination of the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood in Indonesia, stated that the doctrine of hijrah is the main idea of Tarbiyah which not only sees the change in behavior of Muslim women who previously did not wear hijab (*hijab*) to become using it, but also touches on the aspect of ownership of religious knowledge. Yudi Latif concluded that actually the purpose of the Tarbiyah movement is return to the Islamic way.<sup>17</sup> This *hijrah da'wah* is what they campaign through seminars and forums for Islamic studies in the form of *liqā'* and *usrab*.

Another movement that is categorized as fundamentalist Islam is the Salafi Community. Salafi also used public universities in Indonesia as the base of the movement at the beginning of its emergence in Indonesia. However, in contrast to the pattern of the Salafi movement, which was previously considered a conservative and closed Islamic organization, this assessment has been obscured along with the transformation of the Islamic *da'wah* model that it has carried out in the last two decades. The emergence of Salafi madrassas that have succeeded in integrating the religious and national education curriculum,<sup>18</sup> as well as a number of urban salafism movements that have stood in several cities in Indonesia are evidence of the undeniable transformation of Salafi's *da'wah*. In some ways, the ideas of salafism have become inclusive because they utilize digital platforms as a *da'wah* medium and integrate them with Islamic pop culture. The urban salafism-based *da'wah*

<sup>16</sup> Zam Zam Nurhuda, "Ideology of Sayyid Qutb and Movement of Tarbiyah in Indonesia: A Linguistics Approach," *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research* 154 (2018): 113-117.

<sup>17</sup> Latif, "The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in Modernization of Indonesia."

<sup>18</sup> Muthohirin, "Salafi Madrasas"; Saparudin, "Salafism, State Recognition and Local Tension: New Trends in Islamic Education in Lombok," *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies* 21, no. 1 (2017): 81-107.

model has succeeded in recruiting urban communities experiencing spiritual crises such as artists, musicians, directors, businessmen, social media influencers, digital content producers, and others.<sup>19</sup>

On one aspect of the vision of the Salafi movement aspires to an Islamic life like the *salaf al-sâlih* period, but their current lifestyle cannot be separated from the influence of adaptive modernity on the use of cosmetics and branded clothes, as well as the use of information technology. Salaf's adaptation to modernity and popular lifestyles is part of a new strategy of what is known as Islamic neo-fundamentalism. The transformation of the Neo-fundamentalism movement of Islam has undergone significant development thanks to its accommodating attitude towards changing times. Olivier Roy argues that in the era of liberal democracy, Salafis transformed their movement by engaging in official political life; new involvement in the social sphere, both at the moral, customary, and economic levels; and the formation of small groups—both ultraconservative religious movements and terrorist groups (Salafi-Jihadists).<sup>20</sup> These groups are also seen entering the fields of education, social, and political parties.

Thus, the transformation of Islamic fundamentalist movements does not change their main doctrines, especially regarding the *da'wah* of *hijrah*. However, in the digital era, the *hijrah da'wah* model is transformed through various ways that are adaptive to the development of the digital world. Almost all platforms on social media are targeted by creative Islamic *da'wah* that they produce with various patterns and religious views. This article explains the genealogy and infiltration of Islamic fundamentalism movements in universities, then how they transformed the doctrine of *hijrah* into a creative model of Islamic *da'wah* in the digital era, so that the alternative Islamic *da'wah* succeeded in forming the plurality of Muslim youth piety in contemporary Indonesia.

Therefore, the research method primarily utilizes qualitative research, which is a systematic approach to gathering existing literature and data relevant to the study's focus. This method is par-

<sup>19</sup> F. Aidulsyah, "The Rise of Urban Salafism in Indonesia: The Social-Media and Pop Culture of New Indonesian Islamic Youth," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 51, no. 4 (2023): 252-259.

<sup>20</sup> Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (New York: Harvard University Press, 1994), 89.

ticularly effective in exploring the complex interplay between Islamic fundamentalism and the diverse expressions of piety among young Muslims in the context of social media. Library research allows for a comprehensive review of existing scholarly articles, books, and other academic resources that provide insights into the phenomenon being studied.

This approach is supported by Slipińska, who emphasizes the importance of secondary observation in social media research, highlighting how theoretical frameworks can be implemented through a desk-based methodology to analyze digital interactions and their implications for social phenomena.<sup>21</sup> In the context of the article, library research facilitates the examination of various sources that discuss the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the plurality of Muslim identities as expressed on social media platforms. This is complemented by Pennington's exploration of textual analysis as a method to interrogate media content, which aligns with the article's aim to analyze the ideological and cultural assumptions present in digital expressions of faith.<sup>22</sup> The qualitative nature of library research allows the authors to synthesize findings from diverse studies, thereby enriching their analysis of how young Muslims navigate their religious identities in a digital landscape.

## One Ideology, Various Movement Patterns

The terrorist attack in the United States of America (USA) on September 11, 2001 was considered the beginning of the eruption of a large-scale Islamic fundamentalist movement. Coupled with various conflicts in the Middle East in the last two decades that have caused many immigrants from these countries to visit the United States and countries in Europe. As a result, France, Germany, Hungary, and other European countries took a conservative political stance by implementing policies of Islamophobia. In Hungary, for example, Viktor Orban's victory as prime minister in

<sup>21</sup> Kamila Slipińska, "Secondary Observation as a Method of Social Media Research: Theoretical Considerations and Implementation," *European Research Studies Journal* 23, no. 2 (2020): 502-516.

<sup>22</sup> Rosemary Pennington, "Social Media as Third Spaces? Exploring Muslim Identity and Connection in Tumblr," *International Communication Gazette* 80, no. 7 (2018): 169-186.

2010 represented the dominance of right-wing political movements that have long campaigned for Islamophobic sentiments. Such Islamophobic sentiment has contributed to the rise of anti-Muslim immigrants coming from countries in the Middle East.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile in the USA, The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) found a number of churches in Florida planning to burn the Qur'ān in a large gathering titled *International Burn a Koran Day*. Although it was eventually canceled, the event, which was planned to be organized by the World Dove Outreach Center, will distribute the Qur'ān to every church worshipper, the general public, law enforcement and media workers. After being distributed, the Qur'ān will be burned at the moment of commemoration of the tragedy of September 11, 2010. In Indonesia, the arson action plan was protested by the Islamic masses who wanted the Islamophobic policy to be repealed.<sup>24</sup>

Islamophobic restrictive policies and various anti-Muslim attitudes exacerbate the hatred of some Muslims against the West. These policies contribute to the growing global Islamic fundamentalism movement because they are considered discriminatory and unfair to Muslims. For Salafi-Jihadists, the narrative of injustice becomes a fire for the justification of religious extremism doctrines and movements. Meanwhile, for Salafi Ideologues and other Islamic fundamentalist activists, the discriminatory treatment and issues of marginalization of Muslims due to conflicts in the Middle East, become anti-Western propaganda with various products of thought sourced from there, such as democracy, human rights, secularism, liberalism, and others.<sup>25</sup> In Indonesia, for example, an-

<sup>23</sup> Apipudin and Alwi Alatas, "Origin of Islamophobia in Europe: A Case Study of Hungary," *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization* 14, no. 1 (2024): 104-120. See also Zafar Iqbal, *Islamophobia: History, Context and Deconstruction* (New York: SAGE Publications Pvt Ltd, 2020).

<sup>24</sup> VOAnews.com, "Indonesian Muslims Protest Plans to Burn Koran on September 11," *VOA*, September 04, 2010, <https://www.voanews.com/a/indonesian-muslims-protest-plans-to-burn-koran-on-september-11-102250384/125212.html> (accessed January 12, 2025).

<sup>25</sup> Salafi are divided into two groups, Salafi-Ideology and Salafi-Jihadi. The first group aspires to a life like the *salaf al-salih* period by trying to revive the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, while the second group seeks the formation of a religious state through religious understanding and radical extremist actions, read more in Muthohirin, *Fundamentalisme Islam* and Muthohirin, "Salafi Madrasas."

ti-Western propaganda is often campaigned by HTI as a narrative of ideological resistance. Thus, Islamic fundamentalism has a variety of movements, namely Islamic political parties, religious organizations oriented towards rejecting the ideas of modernism and secularism, and Islamic extremism.<sup>26</sup>

According to Huntington, radical Islamic fundamentalism resists the West, assuming that secular countries dominate global politics and subordinate the role of Islamic states. Islamic fundamentalism considers the resistance to be not just nostalgia for the success of Islam in the past, but a resistance to Western hegemony. So, Huntington said, the conflict between the two great powers (Islam and the West) is also centered on issues regarding weapons production, human rights and democracy, oil control, migration, Islamist group terrorism, and Western intervention at the international level.<sup>27</sup>

Tariq Ali suspected Islamic fundamentalism as also a threat to the new world and to the global economy. According to him, the challenge is in the form of rivalry between market fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism.<sup>28</sup> The global economy dominated by the West has given birth to injustice, discrimination, economic dependence, and various humanitarian disasters experienced by Muslims. Thus, religious fundamentalism appears in the form of the power of political Islam against market fundamentalism. Unfortu-

<sup>26</sup> According to Khamami Zada's argument, these three movements are not only categorized into fundamentalist Islam, but are also part of radical Islamic groups. Because, *first*, Islamic fundamentalism fights for Islam in a totalistic (*kaffah*) manner; Islamic *shari'ah* is the law of the state, Islam is the basis of the state, as well as Islam is a political system so that it is not a democracy that is a national political system. *Second*, Islamic fundamentalism bases its religious practices on the orientation of the past (*Salaf*). *Third*, Islamic fundamentalism is hostile to the West with all its products of thought. Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal; Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras* (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 18. See also Niamatullah Ibrahim, "A Violent Nexus: Ethnonationalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Taliban," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2023): 22-37.

<sup>27</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Scuster, 1996), 212.

<sup>28</sup> Tariq Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalism; Crusades, Jihads and Modernity* (London & New York: Verso, 2002); Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 73 (2002), 145-170; Fajar Riza Ul Haq, "Islam dan Gerakan Sosial" (MA Thesis--CRCS Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta, 2001), 4.

nately, in some cases, the appearance of Islamic political power has implications for acts of radicalism and religious extremism.<sup>29</sup>

Meanwhile, Esposito disagreed with the use of Islamic fundamentalist terminology. The term is too provocative and pejorative because it is rooted in the history of Christians.<sup>30</sup> Esposito mentioned Islamic fundamentalism a revivalist Islam because it represents the rebirth of Islamic political power. Sa'id al-Asymawi mentioned *al-Uṣūlīyah al-Islāmiyah*, which means returning to the foundations of faith, the establishment of the political power of the *ummah*, and the strengthening of the foundations of legitimate authority (*al-Hukm al-Shar'īyah*). This meaning wants to clarify the Islamic fundamentalism movement as a movement group that fights for Islamic politics.

Fundamentalism in al-Asymawi's perspective has two radically different forms: *First*, political fundamentalism that aspires to the glory of Islam through practical politics. This group tends to take advantage of the established system of government to realize Islamic doctrine into state rules. The strategy of political fundamentalism activists is more open to other groups because they are of the view that to change the ideology and system of the state, it requires a way to control the government first. *Second*, rationalist-spiritualist fundamentalism that wants the formation of Islamic leadership through public awareness.<sup>31</sup> This can be done by Islamic recitations by making small enclaves in rural areas, cities, universities, mosques, and offices. These small enclaves subsequently became a solid Islamic social movement. This group is overshadowed by the way of life as it was during *salaf al-sālib*. Al-Asymawi wanted to give a firm line that in principle, Islamic fundamentalism wants the repoliticization of Islam as the basis of state law. How-

<sup>29</sup> Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?" *South-east Asian Affairs* 2004, eds. Daljit Singh and Kin Wah Chin (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2004), 104-122. Ali Omidi, Kashif Hasan Khan, and Oskar Schortz, "Explaining the Vicious Circle of Political Repression and Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia," *Cogent Social Sciences* 10, no. 1 (2024): 1-17; Nafik Muthohirin, "Radikalisme Islam dan Pergerakannya di Media Sosial," *Afkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 11, no. 2 (2015): 240-259.

<sup>30</sup> John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

<sup>31</sup> Muhammad Sa'id al-Asymawi, *Islam and The Political Order* (Washington D.C: the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), 78.

ever, the common thread of the two groups categorized by al-Asymawi is oriented towards making Islam a system of government.

Bassam Tibi also considers Islamic fundamentalism as a group that seeks to repoliticize Islam.<sup>32</sup> This is shown to create a new government by wanting to display the glory of Islam like during the Ottoman Turkish caliphate. Islamic fundamentalism wants world power to be held by the caliph again, both in political, military, scientific, cultural, and economic aspects. Likewise, Bernard Lewis sees Western progress and Islamic fundamentalism as serious problems for some Muslims. The emergence of various acts of terror spearheaded by various radical Islamic organizations is seen as a reaction to the defeat of Muslims and their hatred of Western symbols.<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism views Western progress as having implications for the marginalization of Muslim countries. Western development has positioned Muslims in the worst possible place, namely societies experiencing poverty, hunger, civil war, and terrorism. Through this perspective, for Islamic extremist groups, Muslims are experiencing a period of crisis due to Western development, so radical Islamic fundamentalism uses war and acts of religious terrorism as a worthy way to destroy the symbols of Western power, even though such actions are considered regression.

## Genealogy and Transmission

Islamic fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon that is not easy to find the root of the problem. Its existence dates back to the time of the Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib,<sup>34</sup> and continues to be one of

<sup>32</sup> Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*.

<sup>33</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003); Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>34</sup> This analysis is in accordance with the perspective that says the seeds of Islamic fundamentalism have grown since the time of the leadership of Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib, when there was *tahkim* or *arbitration* between the forces of Ali and Muawiyah, which ultimately led to the murder of Ali by the Khawarij faction. Sukron Kamil, *Islam dan Demokrasi* (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 2002), 123; Abul A'la al-Maududi, *Khalifah dan Kerajaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), 164-188. Islamic extremism in the early period of Islamic history was clearly aimed at

the most militant Islamic political movements of the contemporary era. The militancy of Islamic fundamentalism movements is connected to various aspects, ranging from ideological, theological, identity politics, to socio-economic aspects.<sup>35</sup> This phenomenon occurs because the movement pattern is built on religious premises to fight against global political forces. Therefore, the rapid flow of modernization to the most liberal downstream urges the Islamic fundamentalism movement to rise. Global power politics is suspected of controlling the future of the world economy and dragging Islamist groups into the nuances of revenge, especially after the defeat of Arab countries against Israel in a war known as *the War of Attrition* (1966-1970).

A few years later, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran (1979), the Muslim world experienced a wave of global Islamism. A number of figures such as Ali Shariati, Murtadha Muthahhari, and Ayatollah Khomeini became the most obvious inspiration for the return of the Islamic caliphate. The political event underscored the Muslim world's concern that Islamic government is not a utopia. Indonesia is one of the countries that has experienced this wave of Islamism. Organizations with Islamic radicalism ideologies rooted in the Middle East emerged and developed in Indonesia in the early 1980s.<sup>36</sup> Imdadun Rahmat also said that Tarbiyah transmitted his ideas in almost all aspects of life at that time.<sup>37</sup> Then in the present era, the *Salafi Madkhaliyah*, contributes to the dissemination of Islamic *da'wah* and Islamic studies, supports the anti-terrorism and deradicalization movements, but stays away from the political aspect.<sup>38</sup> The process of transmitting

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the Khawārij group as written by Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, *Agama, Negara dan Penerapan Syariat Islam* (Yogyakarta: Fajar Pustaka Baru, 2001), 139-149.

<sup>35</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, "Ideologi, Identitas dan Ekonomi Politik Kekerasan: Mencari Model Solusi Mengatasi Ancaman Radikalisme dan Terorisme di Indonesia," *Prisma* 29 (2010): 3-24; Ismail Salwa, "Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism, and Identity Politics," *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 1 (2004): 614-631.

<sup>36</sup> M. Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran dan Prospek Demokrasi* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2007), 34.

<sup>37</sup> Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal; Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005).

<sup>38</sup> Sunarwoto, "Negotiating Salafi Islam and the State: The *Madkhaliyah* in Indonesia," *Die Welt Des Islams* 60 (2020): 205-234.

the ideology of various Islamic movements has been facilitated because of the moderate attitude of Muslims in Indonesia who consider the Middle East as the center of Islamic civilization.<sup>39</sup>

After the Reform (1998), various movements of Islamic fundamentalism colored the religious diversity of society. The presence of a number of Islamic organizations interrupted public awareness through the insistence on the formalization of sharia-based regional regulations, religious commodification, the struggle of the Islamic caliphate, and acts of religious intolerance and terrorism. Yudi Latif explained that the reason why Islamic fundamentalism activists are campaigning for the vision of Islamic formalism is because they think that Muslims are being hegemonized by the influence of modernism, secularism, and globalism.<sup>40</sup>

Latif and Rahmat said that the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism activists began with the establishment of the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia/DDII*). Through the guidance of a number of mentors, such as Mohammad Nastir, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, M. Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby, DDII has experienced significant development by utilizing state university mosques as a cadre base and Islamic activist movement. In addition, the birth of Tarbiyah was also influenced by the role of intellectuals Imaduddin Abdurrahim in building the strength of the organizational system. Quoted from Imdadun Rahmat:

Imaduddin introduced the thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood in campus *da'wah* network forums. The introduction to this mode occurred in the early days of the usrah movement. This early period can be said to be the embryo of the full transmission of Muslim Brotherhood thought.<sup>41</sup>

The *usrah* movement is the official cadre system of the Muslim Brotherhood which is considered a solid shield for members. When interpreted linguistically, *usrah* means family or friends, while by term it means a group bound by common interests, such as work, education, or a vision of preparing for the future of Islam.

<sup>39</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Future of World Politics*, trans. M. Sadar Ismail (Yogyakarta: Qolam 2000), 184.

<sup>40</sup> Latif, "The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in Modernization of Indonesia."

<sup>41</sup> Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, 87.

The *usrab* mentoring model explains Tarbiyah's commitment to solidarity and empowerment of members. This mentoring concept is a cell system that relies on the strength of interpersonal relationships in a group of 15-20 members.<sup>42</sup> The *usrab* system has succeeded in strengthening the emotions of cadres and expanding the organizational network in various public universities in Indonesia.

At the beginning of the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement, Imaduddin played an important role in developing *usrab* as a regeneration system. He introduced the thoughts of Hasan al-Bannā and Sayyid Qutb through *usrab*. In fact, he made Qutb's books such as *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* and *fi Zhilāl al-Qur'ān* as a guideline for the cadre system in the Tarbiyah movement. Tarbiyah's ideas immediately spread because they relied on the cell work system (*usrab*). Tarbiyah cadres who are considered to have understood the two guidelines are required to create an Islamic study group (*liqā'*). The concept of *liqā'* is then carried out from one cadre to another cadre candidate, one mosque to another, and one university to another.

The Tarbiyah movement first appeared at the Salman Mosque of the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB).<sup>43</sup> At first, Tarbiyah activists invited other students to pray in congregation. After the prayer, they continued with Islamic discussions in the mosque as well. On another occasion, Imaduddin together with Tarbiyah activists initiated the establishment of the Mujahid Dakwah Training (*Latihan Mujahid Dakwah/LMD*) in 1973.<sup>44</sup> Through the mentoring program, the indoctrination of Tarbiyah ideas for the first time was taught to prospective cadres. The emphasis on the importance of '*aqidah* and *monotheism* is the main material conveyed by mentors

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<sup>42</sup> Suaidi Asyari and M. Husnul Abid, "Expanding the Indonesian Tarbiyah Movement Through Ta'aruf and Marriage," *Al-Jamiah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 54, no. 2 (2016): 337-368.

<sup>43</sup> The establishment of the Salman Mosque, ITB, was initiated by several students such as T.M. Soelaiman, Ahmad Sadali and his younger brother, and Nukman. See Abdul Aziz (ed.), *Gerakan Kontemporer Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989), 211.

<sup>44</sup> For more details on LMD, see Rifki Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung Indonesia" (MA Thesis-The Australian National University, Canberra, 1995); H.K. Dipojono, "Bang Imad yang Saya Kenal" and H. Radjasa, "Bang Imad, Guru Spiritual dan Intelektual," in *Bang Imad: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Dakwahnya*, ed. J. Asshiddiqie (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002), 215-221.

(*murabbi*) so that Muslims stay away from the influence of modernism and secularism that cause damage to thinking (*ghazw al-fikr*). This material is the most important part of *hijrah da'wah* which is actually the main teaching of the Tarbiyah (Muslim Brotherhood) movement. “The spirit of *hijrah* is a ritual that marks the transition before and after becoming a Tarbiyah activist.”<sup>45</sup>

The LMD program uses a training approach that binds participant engagement from start to finish. Participants are required to stay in the university mosque during the training period and are not allowed to communicate with activities outside the training. The activity started at 4:00 am and began the activity with congregational morning prayer (*Subh*). After that, participants followed the materials in a number of small discussion groups and they were woken up in the middle of the night to perform the *tabajjud* prayer. On the last night of the activity, all participants were asked to take an oath of allegiance by reciting two sentences of shahada and were not allowed to leave the membership of the organization. The understanding of Islam taught in the LMD program is not commonly practiced by Muslims in Indonesia. One of the things she highlighted was the use of hijab that was too wide and dark-colored for female activists. The unusual model of using the hijab is ultimately the most striking feature of the Islamic fundamentalist identity.

In the next development, participants who graduated from the training had an important task of becoming mentors in small discussions (*halaqah/liqā'*) that they initiated individually. In the future, *liqā'* or *halaqah* centered in the Salman Mosque ran consistently and increasingly spread in a number of universities in Bandung. In fact, the participants not only came from student backgrounds, but also from high school students. Finally, the Islamic activists of the Salman Mosque accommodated the enthusiasm through the establishment of the Salman Islamic Youth Community (KARISMA). In the following years, the effectiveness of the cadre model through LMD, *usrah*, and *liqā'* at the Salman Mosque initiated the same strategy in a number of other public universities such

<sup>45</sup> Arnold van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, trans. By Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 190); Asyari and Abid, “Expanding the Indonesian Tarbiyah Movement Through Ta’aruf and Marriage.”

as the Al-Ghifari mosque of the Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), the Salahuddin mosque at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) Yogyakarta, the Arif Rahman Hakim mosque at the Institut Teknologi Sepuluh November (ITS) Surabaya, and the Ukhudah Islamiyah mosque at the Universitas Indonesia (UI), Nuruzzaman mosque at Universitas Airlangga (UNAIR) Surabaya, Brawijaya University (UNIBRAW) Malang, Universitas Negeri Jakarta (UNJ), Universitas Negeri Sriwijaya (UNSRI) Palembang, and several other state universities. The LMD program in several state universities became the embryo for the spread of Islamic fundamentalist thought. In the future, the program was more popular as the Campus Dakwah Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK*).<sup>46</sup>

LDK's activism in various campaigns continues to grow and its movement pattern has undergone a significant transformation in the last decade. Prior to 2010, the piety of Islamic fundamentalist activists only came from the system of *lq'a*, *usrah*, and weekly newsletters. Its various Islamic activities are oriented towards increasing religious understanding and empowering cadres. In addition, LDK activists are also active in political activities at the student level. In addition, in terms of establishing social relations, it is limited only to its own community. Likewise, in dress, LDK female activists were partly veiled and covered with palms, while male activists wore cocoa shirts, pants above the ankles. However, in the last decade, the sources of individual piety formation have become more varied with Islamic *da'wah* models that utilize social media. Fundamentalist Islamic activists use digital space as an alternative medium to strengthen religious knowledge. Thus, the forms of piety of Islamic fundamentalist activists become more plural and dynamic by narrating the concept of *hijrah* and Islamic popular culture on social media.

### **The Role of Islamic Fundamentalist Intellectuals**

Islamic intellectuals played an important role in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in various countries. As in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood became a key actor in the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. Then in January 2012, his party's wing, the Free and Justice

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<sup>46</sup> Latif, "The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in Modernization of Indonesia"; Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, 86-102.

Party (FJP), won the general election with 47% of the seats in parliament and overthrew the government of Hosni Mubarak, while Salafi's al-Nur Party came in second with 29% of the seats. This fact explains the success of the intellectual role of Islamic fundamentalism activists in building the power of political agitation through social networks, Islamic education, health, and social empowerment.<sup>47</sup> Unfortunately, the victory did not last long. Military power regained control of Egypt, while the Muslim Brotherhood was considered a banned organization.<sup>48</sup>

The phenomenon of Islamic intellectual involvement in politics also occurs in other Islamic countries such as Iran, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and others. The establishment of the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan/PK*), now transformed into the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS*), in the midst of the political stage has an inseparable history of the involvement of Harakah Tarbiyah activists based in a number of universities in Indonesia. They mobilized resources ranging from selecting cadres who have the potential to become activist in PKS and certain demonstrations in order to voice Islamic interests.<sup>49</sup> The important role of Islamic intellectuals can be proven by their success in placing their cadres as legislative members, for example Rama Pratama (PKS legislative member 2004-2009, Chairman of the Student Senate of the Universitas Indonesia in 1997), Zulkiflimansyah (PKS legislative member 2004-2009 and 2009-2014, Chairman of the Universitas Indonesia Student Senate in 1994), and Selamat Nurdin (PKS Chairman of the Special Capital Region Jakarta 2010-2015, Chairman of the Student Senate in 1996).

Some of these LDK activists are portraits of the successful role of Islamic fundamentalism intellectuals in practical politics. One of the keys to the success of Tarbiyah movement is motivated by a systematic, loyal, and adequate intellectual network of cadre tools. In addition, the recruitment model emphasizes the solidity

<sup>47</sup> Mariz Tadros, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined?* (London: Routledge, 2012).

<sup>48</sup> Mahmoud Jaraba, "Why Did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Year-Long Rule Fall?" *Zeitschrift für Politik* 61, no. 1 (2014): 61-80.

<sup>49</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS: Suara dan Syariah* (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia/KPG, 2012), 123; Richard G. Kraince, "The Role of Islamic Student Group in the *Reformasi* Struggle: KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit)," *Studia Islamika* 7, no. 1 (2000).

of brotherhood (*ukhuwwah*), the formation of piety identity (*hijrah*), interpersonal approach, and Islamic studies programs such as *halaqah* and *usrah*.<sup>50</sup> The important role of Tarbiyah Islamic intellectuals can also be observed in the Islamic education sector, Islamic philanthropy, Islamic mass media, Islamic banking, and influencers on social media. In the field of education, the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism appear brilliantly in the establishment of religious-based schools in cities. With its pattern that prioritizes the integration of the Islamic education curriculum with the national and international curriculum, Salafi and Tarbiyah schools have received great attention from urban communities.<sup>51</sup>

In recent years, Salafi Islamic preachers have played an important role in the dissemination of Salafi ideas through media networks, both by conventional means such as radio and community magazines as well as digital media such as *YouTube*, *Instagram*, *Facebook*, and other online news portals. Rodja TV, a media network platform managed by Salafi in Indonesia. This media focuses on Salafi Islamic *da'wah* by emphasizing aspects of purification of faith and monotheism, understanding of the Prophet's sunnah, and criticism of heresy practices, as well as demonstrating rejection of modern ideas, such as democracy, human rights, and women's rights.<sup>52</sup> In fact, Rodja TV has relationships and has succeeded in framing commercial media in Indonesia, especially in Trans7 with salafism ideas. Several Salafi preachers such as Badrussalam, Syafiq Reza Basalamah, and Budi Azhari manage Islamic *da'wah* events at Trans7.<sup>53</sup> They understand the important role of media management, so that the mainstreaming of Salafism ideas through media networks is a priority that is as important as the Islamic *da'wah* agenda itself.

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<sup>50</sup> Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 67-81.

<sup>51</sup> Muthohirin, "Salafi Madrasas."

<sup>52</sup> Ayang Utriza Yakin, "Salafi Dakwah and the Dissemination of Islamic Puritanism in Indonesia: A Case Study of the Radio of Rodja," *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies* 22, no. 2 (2018): 205-236.

<sup>53</sup> Ahmad Subakir, "Challenging the Mainstreams: Broadcasting Salafi Da'wah on Indonesian TV Channels," *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies* 28, no. 2 (2024): 681-709.

## The Plurality of Digital Muslim Piety

The struggle of Islamic fundamentalism from its inception in the early 1980s to the present has shown significant development. Although HTI was dissolved in 2017, however the ideas of upholding the Islamic Caliphate are still being disseminated on social media. So, in general, the existence of the Islamic fundamentalism network still has a great influence in Indonesia.



**Figure 1.** The Narration on Upholding the Islamic Caliphate in Social Media. Source: <https://www.instagram.com/khilafahchannel/>

In an era that is all connected to the internet, Islamic fundamentalism transforms its movement through hijrah *da'wah* on so-

cial media. Islamic preachers are using digital technology as a new way to broadcast Islamic doctrine to young Muslim.<sup>54</sup> Islamic fundamentalism activists view that conventional ways of preaching Islam, such as *halaqah* and *usrab* or Islamic recitation in public mosques, although all of these activities are still the main *da'wah* model, but maximizing social media as an alternative *da'wah* space is an absolute. Especially with the rationalization regarding the segmentation of social media users in Indonesia which amounts to 139 million and the majority of them are young people.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, Islamic populism that has developed in a number of countries, including in Indonesia,<sup>56</sup> has helped encourage Islamic fundamentalism to transform its *da'wah* movement into a more inclusive one so that it is not justified as part of a radical Islamic organization or pro-religious violence.<sup>57</sup> In the context of Indonesia, the transformation is carried out through the narrative of *hijrah da'wah* by accommodating popular Islamic culture.<sup>58</sup> Young and cool preachers, who were previously not taken into account in the formation of religious piety, sprung up by preaching Islamic values on social media. They build authority through religious doctrines wrapped in current trends and young people's passions, so social media has a great influence on the migration of Muslim youth to explore internet-based religious knowledge.<sup>59</sup>

Through these various creative contents, they also tell the message of Islamic *da'wah* on various platforms and Islamic discussion communities on social media.<sup>60</sup> Unlike conventional Islamic

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<sup>54</sup> Martin Slama, "Practising Islam through Social Media in Indonesia," *Indonesia and the Malay World*, 46 (134) (2018): 1-4.

<sup>55</sup> Quoted from *Hootsuite and We Are Social* (2024), <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-indonesia> (accessed January 12, 2025).

<sup>56</sup> Greg Barton, Ihsan Yilmaz, and Nicholas Morieson, "Religious and Pro-Violence Populism in Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of a Far-Right Islamist Civilisationist Movement," *Religions* 12, no. 6 (2021): 397.

<sup>57</sup> Muthohirin, "Salafi Madrasas."

<sup>58</sup> Aidulsyah, "The Rise of Urban Salafism in Indonesia"; Hamzah Fansuri, "On the Road of *Hijrah*: Contesting Identity through Urban Mobilities in Contemporary Indonesian Muslims," *Archipel* 105 (2023): 115-139.

<sup>59</sup> Akmaliah, "The Rise of Cool Ustadz."

<sup>60</sup> Rahmat Hidayat, Muhammad Sholihin, and Deri Wanto, "The Hijrah Communities and Religious Superficiality: Ideology and Religiosity of the Islamic Hijrah Communities on Social Media," *Journal of Population and Social Studies* (2020): 118-138.

recitations, religious authorities of young preachers such as Hanan Attaki, Felix Siauw, Handy Bonnie, Oki Setiana Dewi, Ning Ummi Laila, and others are built through creative *da'wah* content in the form of short videos on *TikTok*, *Instagram Reels*, and *YouTube Shorts* which contains short lectures, inspirational stories, prayers, and Islamic advices. They apply a model of *da'wah* that is friendly, relaxed in style, full of humor and storytelling, modern and minimalist visual design, straightforward and simple language, inserts Islamic music backgrounds, and even makes popular hashtags such as *#IslamKeren* or *#HijrahYouth*.



Source: Wattpad Inneke Aprilla

Source: quotehijrahh.id

**Figure 2.** Quotes *Hijrah Da'wah* in Social Media

On *Instagram*, *X (Twitter)*, and *Facebook*, *hijrah da'wah* is also conveyed in various infographics and Islamic memes that contain Islamic legal material, *halal* and *haram*, *zakat*, fasting, and other basics of Islamic knowledge. Through the *Pinterest*, *Instagram*, and *Tumblr* platforms, Islamic *da'wah* is delivered in the form of Islamic quotes containing *Hadīth* quotes, verses of the *Qur'ān*, or advice of scholars in digital posters that are aesthetically designed, modern, a combination of calligraphy and landscape images, pleasant pastel or monochrome colors, and use easy-to-read fonts.

In addition, through *YouTube*, *Spotify*, and *Instagram* platforms, the formation of Muslim youth piety is carried out through *podcast* or *live streaming programs* that examine current issues from an Islamic perspective. Events like this usually invite young and inclusive preachers, even celebrities or influencers who have emigrated. The

topics can be various such as “Islam and Social Media,” “Islamic Dating,” “Alms Together,” “Islamic Morality,” or just telling stories about the experiences of artists or individuals who have migrated. Afterwards, there was a Q&A session with the audience about religious issues.

Other forms of Islamic creative content on *TikTok*, *Instagram*, and *YouTube* platforms contain “Islamic Viral Campaigns” that involve followers to participate in memorizing short letters, participating in Islamic book studies, social campaigns, and the use of specific hashtags such as *#HijrahCinta*, *#QuoteHijrah*, *#NgajiYuk* or *#BerbalasKebaikan*. In fact, to target the segment of young Muslim who are still in high school, Islamic creative content is easy to find in the form of animated series or Islamic comics that tell the story of the example of the prophets and companions that contain a moral message at the end of the story. In addition, the existence of Islamic games or interactive applications is also produced so that children can easily learn the Qur’ān and memorize prayers.

In addition to social media, the hijrah *da’wah* campaign is also carried out with direct encounter activities. A number of missionaries continue to maintain the popular *da’wah* model involving influencers, artists, and micro-celebrities by holding various major events such as HijrahFest (Hijrah Festival), Tabligh Akbar Konser Langit, Tarbiyah Sunnah Event, Hijrah Youth Workshop, and others. Two young *ustādhs* such as Felix Siauw and Hanan Attaki hold various community-based activities such as skateboarding, snorkeling, visiting the beach, and other hobby-based events.<sup>61</sup> All of these activities are wrapped in the breath of Islam. In one of his video clips, Hanan Attaki argues that hijrah *da’wah* is a big narrative that needs to be preached to young Muslim with a new, trendy, and community-based approach in the digital era.<sup>62</sup> With a variety of interesting Islamic *da’wah* models, the use of easy-to-understand language, the involvement of Muslim influencers, and great attention to visual and audio quality to maintain the quality of content,

<sup>61</sup> Hew Wai Weng, “The Art of *Dakwah*: Social Media, Visual Persuasion and the Islamist Propagation of Felix Siauw,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 46, no. 134 (2018): 61-79.

<sup>62</sup> Nafik Muthohirin, “Da’wah in Social Media: The Views of Ustadz Hanan Attaki and Felix Siauw to The Hijrah Phenomenon,” *Ajkaruna: Indonesian Interdisciplinary Journal of Islamic Studies* 17, no. 2 (2021): 249-270.

the popularity of *hijrah da'wah* has managed to reach many audiences from the millennial generation.

It is undeniable that the formation of piety through *hijrah da'wah* is a trend for young Muslim today. One of the important factors comes from the active involvement of young preachers on social media. They produce various narratives of *hijrah da'wah* on social media with the aim of motivating changes so that young people's behavior is in accordance with the Islamic faith. The high intensity of social media use affects the way young people gain religious knowledge. They prefer to access information about Islamic values through the internet rather than learning about traditional religions, such as visiting *liqā'*, *usrab*, or formal Islamic schools such as Islamic schools (*madrasahs*) and Islamic boarding schools (*pesantrens*).

Thus, there has been a shift in religious learning patterns for young Muslim. Slama assessed that the online activities of Muslim teenagers are no different from their daily religious practices. Therefore, activities on social media are part of the efforts of young Muslim to increase religious piety.<sup>63</sup> However, social media is like a free market, where every individual can market their products without any strict screening efforts. Even with religious literature in the digital era, which has the opposite implication that young Muslim who base their religious understanding only on Islamic creative content will be easily influenced by various religious ideologies. Moreover, the nature of religion in the digital era is instantaneous, and not all preachers have the capacity and authority to talk about religion at large, they do it only because of their success in changing narratives and interpretations into religious values.<sup>64</sup>

As a result, the religious model of the *hijrah* community on social media is like two sides of the sword, where on the one hand it provides easy access to religious references to young Muslim and invites them to change their habits from those who previously behaved badly to the better, as mentioned by Asad and Geertz that digital *da'wah* affects the process of forming religious identity,

<sup>63</sup> Slama, "Practising Islam through Social Media in Indonesia."

<sup>64</sup> Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Muslim Televangelist in the Making: Conversion Narratives and the Construction of Religious Authority," *The Muslim World* 110, no. 2 (2020): 154-175; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books Press, 1973).

which is considered to be able to provide useful knowledge.<sup>65</sup> But on the other hand, religion that is instantaneous by only basing religious knowledge from digital Islamic content will only provide a superficial understanding of religion and is easily influenced by various forms of fundamentalist-radical religious ideologies.

For young Muslim in Indonesia, *hijrah da'wah* is no different from a socio-religious phenomenon that occurs due to agency factors. This agency plays the influence of individuals by producing *hijrah* narratives in a repetitive, conceptual, and massive manner. Martin Hewson classifies the types of agencies into three things, namely individual, proxy, and collective.<sup>66</sup> Although in the context of *hijrah da'wah* in the digital era that plays an important role are young preachers individuals as the main agency, *hijrah da'wah* is a collective and collaborative action among certain agents (preachers, social media influencers, and *hijrah* artists) with the common goal of inviting to virtue. As Hewson argues about collective agency, certain social change goals can be achieved if each actor has an agenda, a vision and acts together.<sup>67</sup> In that context, the collective power initiated by preachers, social media influencers, and *hijrah* artists in narrating *hijrah da'wah* on social media together has succeeded in becoming a campaign to shape the piety of young Muslim in the digital era.

The phenomenon of *hijrah da'wah* on social media which has developed into the formation of various *hijrah* communities in many cities in Indonesia is part of the formation of a collective identity with its own characteristics. Certain narratives are often used to shape the collective identity based on values that are considered authentic, such as digital content about the use of the hijab and the obligation to wear a veil for Muslimah, and lengthen the beard for Muslim, the invitation to stay away from music, art, and tradition, the rejection of democracy, the modern legal system, the principles of human rights, and its opposition to all products of modernity and globalization. The content of the *hijrah da'wah* narrative can cause polarization, namely the separation between

<sup>65</sup> Talal Asad, *Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity* (California: Stanford University Press, 2023); Geertz. *The Interpretation of Cultures*.

<sup>66</sup> Martin Hewson, "Agency," in *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, eds. A. Mills, G. Durepos, and E. Wiebe (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2010), 13-17.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

“those of us who have emigrated” as a group that is more pious than “those who have not emigrated”.

Polarization of religious views is also possible through various video clips of lectures that contain blasphemy against certain groups, such as considering Muslim groups outside their community as heretics and calling them Westerners, liberals, and infidels. In fact, it is often found in social media campaigns and the use of hashtags such as *#HijrahCinta*, *#StopBidah*, or *#JanganIkutBarat*. These contents ultimately give rise to polarization and emphasize the boundaries of differences in attitudes and views of Muslim piety, as well as strengthen the narrative of conflict between fundamentalist and moderate Islamic groups.

This polarization causes an exclusivity among groups that claim to have emigrated. In the context of Islamic fundamentalism, they will consider others to be ungodly and criticize the views or practices of other Muslims as secular religious practices. In this case, *hijrah da'wah* is represented by a number of Islamic fundamentalist movements such as Jamaah Salafi, Harakah Tarbiyah, HTI,<sup>68</sup> and Jamaah Tabligh. Felix Siauw, for example, in his various sermons often interprets *hijrah* by recounting his experiences as a Chinese family, Christian and converting to Muslim. He considers that the stories of his experience of migrating will inspire others to migrate (*hijrah*).<sup>69</sup> He also talked about *hijrah* as an effort to return to the Islamic caliphate.<sup>70</sup>

Various narratives of the piety of *hijrah da'wah*, the phenomenon of religious conversion (becoming *mu'allaf*), and various other expressions of building solidarity among Muslims as experienced by Felix Siauw, Tengku Wisnu, Arie Untung, and a number of other *hijrah* artists, are new patterns of the transformation of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, one of which occurred due to the increase in conservatism and Islamic politics.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, although the modern period marked by digitalization and industrialization predicted that the role of religion would be marginalized, Islamic fundamentalism actually emerged with a new movement pattern.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Akmaliah, “The Rise of Cool Ustadz”; Muthohirin, *Fundamentalisme Islam*.

<sup>69</sup> Muthohirin, “Da'wah in Social Media.”

<sup>70</sup> Felix Siauw, *Khilafah Remake* (N.p.: Al Fatih Press, 2014).

<sup>71</sup> Hamzah Fansuri, “Transforming Faith: Mualaf and Hijrah in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *Entangled Religions* 15, no. 2 (2024): 2-3.

<sup>72</sup> Muthohirin, *Fundamentalisme Islam*.

Even in the context of Indonesia, after the Reform (1998), the prediction of the death of religion is increasingly unproven by the increase in religious expression in the public sphere in the form of Islamic commodification in the fields of economics, business, law, politics, and even tourism. In some cases, religious expression in digital media also appears with the form of extremism and terrorism. Bruinessen considers this religious phenomenon as a “conservative turn”,<sup>73</sup> but the rise of the wave of Islamic fundamentalism with its various variants in contemporary Indonesia is a plurality of piety in responding to modernity and globalization.

In addition, digital space also increasingly provides a place for the growth of various variants of religious piety. Each individual or group can disseminate religious knowledge according to their respective perspectives on social media. Likewise, the audience can get religious literature easily and openly according to their needs. The public can obtain religious literature in a variety of ways that no one could predict before.<sup>74</sup> What topic is desired, from which source, and from which religious knowledge is obtained. Thus, everyone can learn Islamic values or morals together through the internet, but the understanding and practice of Islam obtained will form a plural pattern of piety.

The plurality of piety is formed by three things, namely: *First*, as the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism originates from the Middle East, the ideas of Wahhabism, Salafism, or religious extremism spread through social media will shape the piety of religious people with the ideological pattern of each Islamic organization. In general, this group can be categorized as a Muslim community that practices scripturalist piety. Individuals who are members of scripturalist piety put forward a literalist Islamic perspective on the texts of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, often attending online recitations that emphasize knowledge of *fiqh* or Islamic law.

*Second*, the formation of plurality of piety is also influenced by the fragmentation of religious authority on social media. Young preachers or Muslim influencers who campaign for *bijrah da’wah* through Islamic creative contents contribute to shaping the piety

<sup>73</sup> Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013).

<sup>74</sup> Elizabeth M. Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker, *Religious Ethics in a Time of Globalism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).


of young Muslim who are assimilated into Islamic popular culture. Young Muslim who are affiliated with the popular Islamic-based *hijrah da'wah* communities base their religious understanding and practices only on Islamic contents on *YouTube*, *TikTok*, *Reels*, and *Instagram*. The communities focus its studies on Islamic motivation, Islamic humor and stories, and behavior change to an Islamic life-style.

*Third*, the plurality of piety motivated by the main ideas of modernity and globalization. Through Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, preachers and Islamic intellectuals from these two Islamic organizations produce progressive and moderate Islamic narratives by responding to global humanitarian issues such as natural disasters, the environment, human rights, feminism, democracy, health, and other modernity problems. Young figures from the two Islamic organizations created online portals to disseminate the progressive ideas of Islam.<sup>75</sup> Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, for example, through its leadership figures and in general its institutions, has always been committed to strengthening the paradigm of religious moderation since its inception.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Sholihul Huda, M. Mas'udi Maulana, and Nafik Muthohirin, "The Rise of Muhammadiyah's Islamic Da'wah in the Contemporary Era: Transformation to Online Trend and Responses to Islamic Moderation," *Progresiva: Jurnal Pemikiran dan Pendidikan Islam* 11, no. 1 (2022): 1-24.

<sup>76</sup> Syamsul Arifin, Umiarso, Nafik Muthohirin, and Ahmad Nur Fuad, "The Dimensions of Leadership and Ideology in Strengthening and Institutionalizing Religious Moderation in Muhammadiyah," *Legality: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 33, no. 1 (2025): 69-92. Read also Nafik Muthohirin and Suherman, "Muhammadiyah's Educational Philosophy and Contextualization of Islamic Moderation: Challenges to Religious Extremism," in *Strengthening Professional and Spiritual Education through 21<sup>st</sup> Century Skill Empowerment in Pandemic and Post-Pandemic Era*, eds. Syamsul Arifin, Ahmad Fauzi, Triastama Wiraatmaja, Eggy Fajar Andalas, and Nafik Muthohirin (London: Routledge, 2024), 166-172.



**Figure 3.** Navigating Islamic Piety in the Age of Social Media

Thus, young Muslim who are able to contextualize the construct of their understanding of Islam with global humanitarian issues, as well as contribute to finding solutions and being involved in social assistance, are categorized as progressive Islamic piety. The plurality of piety is an inevitability that cannot be denied as an implication for the spread of Islamic *da'wah* on social media. This reality shows that the dynamics of Muslim thinking can not only be felt in religious practices in the real world, but also various religious patterns on social media. Although, the plurality of piety is one of them mentioning the emergence of scripturalist Islamic piety groups, this phenomenon cannot be said unilaterally that Muslims are experiencing a setback. In fact, the plurality of piety shows the flexibility of Islam in responding to the changing times.

## Conclusion

The use of social media has led to significant changes in how religious messages are conveyed and received, with platforms like *YouTube* and *Instagram* playing a pivotal role in shaping the understanding of Islam among young Muslims. The interplay of various Islamic movements and the creative use of digital media contribute to a plurality of piety among Muslim youth in Indonesia, reflecting diverse interpretations and practices of faith.

Islamic fundamentalism as an organization and religious understanding that is described as a textualist, conservative, and exclusive Islamic group to modern thoughts, is currently undergoing a significant transformation of the *da'wah* movement. Although the ideals of the Islamic fundamentalism movement have consistently

fought for Islamic politics, the model of *da'wah* has undergone modifications along with the presence of social media. *Hijrah da'wah*, one of the main doctrines of Islamic fundamentalist movements such as Tarbiyah, Salafi, and HTI, is a narrative campaigned by young preachers in digital media with the aim of motivating millennial Muslims to practice goodness and leave badness. These young and cool preachers are key agents who have succeeded in building religious authority and play an important role in the dissemination of Islamic fundamentalist ideas in contemporary Indonesia. Thus, the presence of social media contributes to providing religious knowledge and shaping the piety of the millennial Muslim based on Islamic literatures on the internet. Ultimately, social media is an ideologically free market that creates a plurality of millennial Muslim piety from moderate or progressive, who are accommodating to Islamic popular culture, to radical-extremist ones.

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